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ORIGINALISM'S EXPIRATION DATE
Adam M. Samaha*

ABSTRACT

The Constitution of the United States declares itself supreme law,
but even the amended document is ancient. By 2008, the predicted age
of a randomly selected word in this text reached 178 years. The
judiciary,for its part, might not interpret the text until decades after
ratification. For Article V amendments, the average lag between
ratificationand Supreme Court interpretationhas been about 40 years.
The question is how these features of our supreme law might influence
the choice of interpretive method and, ultimately, constitutional
decision-making. In particular,some scholars indicate that originalism
may be a strong force in adjudication when constitutional text is still
fresh, but should then fade with time.
This Article is a reassessment of time 's influence on constitutional
adjudication. It begins by investigating the character and suggesting
the causes of time lags in the interpretation of supreme law. It also
identifies the Supreme Court's initial encounters with Article V
amendments and charts some interpretive trends over time. The Article
then turns to the normative arguments for an expiring originalism.
First, it resists the claim that strong judicial originalism is always
desirable in the wake of ratification. Second, itpushes back in the other
direction and explores justifications for a timeless originalism. An
example is the possibility that judicial originalism generates ex ante
incentives for Article V effort. Although unacceptable to some on
principle,for others this justification will be persuasive given certain
empirical assumptions. Finally, an unorthodox analogy is explored.
Within a limited domain, a version of originalism can function as a
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culturally acceptable substitutefor randomization. It turns out that a
corner of supreme law is likely best determined at random, even if
judges will never actually roll dice.
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He confessed that he trembled at the idea of altering it, though he
was attachedto thatpart of it which gave the right of alteringit.
Let the die be cast.tt

INTRODUCTION

Among the more bizarre provisions in the Constitution of the
United States is the procedure for its formal amendment.I Article V
describes a series of supermajority votes before new text becomes
supreme law under Article VI.
Ordinary constitutions-whether
national, state, or local-do not imitate this design. Article V is an
outlier. And it has been little used during the 219 years since the first
version of the document was ratified. By 2008, the predicted age of a
randomly selected word in this text reached 178 years. 2 A long
temporal distance between ratification and interpretation of such text is
therefore the norm. This is the interpretationlag, and it is a persistent
feature of our constitutional system.
There is a second time lag worth understanding. It involves
adjudication.
Decades can pass before the Supreme Court first
interprets constitutional text. While other commentators have indicated
that the judiciary's influence on all policy is seriously limited, 3 the
Court is not the leading voice on the Constitution's meaning, either.
This would be less important if courts interpreted constitutional text
either early or never.4 But courts may try to interpret late. Between
1791 and 2008, the average lag between an amendment's ratification
5
and its first interpretation by the Court was approximately 40 years.
This is the adjudication lag, and it varies tremendously across
amendments.
t 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1286 (1802) (reporting remarks of Rep. Benjamin Huger)
(discussing the Constitution during the debate on whether to add a Twelfth Amendment).
ft 5 PLUTARCH'S LIVES 273 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., 1914) (attributed to Julius Caesar).
There is more than one version of this quotation. See infra notes 157-159.
1 1 mean the document ratified in 1789 and amended via Article V, not more functional
definitions of supreme or constitutional law. I often refer to it as "the document."
2 See infra Part L.A & fig.2.
3 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,

ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123, 251 (1994) (noting that courts can address only a small
fraction of significant policy disputes); cf Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court's Agendaand the Nation's, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9, 49 (2006) (arguing that most Supreme Court
adjudication deals with non-salient, even if sometimes influential, policies).
4 Cf Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 400-07 (1985) (observing that
many clauses are rarely or never litigated, and pointing to relative clarity as a reason).
5 See infra Part I.B & fig.3. The test for Supreme Court "interpretation" used in this
calculation is lax. See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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The interpretation and adjudication lags are realities. The question
is whether they ought to influence how we treat constitutional text
today. For instance, when the Supreme Court adjudicated rights to
possess handguns 6 and petition for habeas corpus 7 last Term, should it
have mattered that relevant constitutional text was more than 200 years
old? Should the Court have been adjudicating First Amendment claims
differently? 8 Was a different approach to these texts required in 1791?
What is the appropriate relationship between the passage of time and the
rendering of supreme law?
There are several possible answers. One option is to disregard the
document. Perhaps a sufficiently long lapse after ratification destroys
any justification for abiding by the Constitution. No official would
openly advocate this position today, but certain practices might only be
understood as departures from the document's meaning to serve felt
needs. At the other extreme is the option of ignoring time lags. Perhaps
the document should have the same legal force today as it did in 1789
and be interpreted in precisely the same way. Strong forms of
originalism suggest this result. They counsel the preservation of textual
meaning using the same interpretive method across generations. 9
Alternatively, it is possible to take an intermediate position on the
proper effect of time lags. A decision-maker might treat the document
as less influential or subject to different interpretive techniques as time
passes, and yet still deserving of some consideration even after two
centuries. There is no shortage of options.
Debate over judicial originalism is, to a degree, already shaped by
the brute facts of interpretation and adjudication lags. Skeptics of
history's use in adjudication might concede that originalism is
justifiable when ratification is a recent memory, but hold that
6 See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S ...
,
128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788-2812, 2816-18,
2821-22 (2008) (recognizing a limited right to handgun possession in the home under the Second
Amendment, and relying on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century history).
7 See Boumediene v. Bush, 554 U.S. __.
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2245-51 (2008) (exploring
English and United States history forerunning the Habeas Clause, albeit without finding specific
guidance).
8 See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 554 U.S ....
128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770-74 (2008)
(invalidating a rollback of campaign contribution limits, with reference to case law and not
originalist history).
9 See infra Part ILI.A (noting versions of originalism).
Some theorists claim that
"interpretation" of a legal text for the purpose of understanding its meaning simply is the
discovery of authorial intent or of public meaning at the time of adoption. See infra notes 114,
183-1184. I use a looser definition of interpretation that captures a wider range of contemporary
usage. See infra text accompanying notes 113-114. This is not to take sides in a conceptual or
definitional debate, however.
The Article speaks to those with narrow definitions of
interpretation as well: At some point, theorists must deal with the potential influence of time on
constitutional decision-making, whether that point is "interpretation" or not. My general concern
is sound decision-making, not interpretation per se. See infra Part ILA; see also Adam M.
Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606,
633-34, 675-77 (2008) (discussing interpretation, information, and decision).
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1298 2008-2009
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originalism has an expiration date. 10 Originalists are sensitive to these
arguments. Their preferred method continues to evolve in its specific
protocol and in its justifications. But neither the criticism nor the
defense of originalism is fully organized around temporal issues. Time
is the central focus of this Article's investigation into supreme law. It
offers two contributions.
First, the Article presents measures and explanations for
interpretation and adjudication lags in supreme law. Clearly the
Constitution is aging and often the Court is an interpretation-laggard.
But we do not always know why. Recognizing this uncertainty is
pertinent to the normative choices surrounding interpretation and
adjudication.1 1 Past practice, moreover, can illuminate feasible options.
The Article therefore identifies the Supreme Court's initial attempts to
understand constitutional amendments and then characterizes some
doctrinal trends thereafter. The basic finding is variety. Sometimes the
Court uses non-originalist arguments to justify case outcomes shortly
after ratification, and sometimes it emphasizes originalist history long
after ratification. There is no obvious pattern, and no easily discerned
feasibility constraint on judicial methodology.

Second, the Article renovates arguments over strong forms of
originalism to concentrate on time lags. Of the methodological
alternatives, originalism might be the most sensitive to time lags, and it

quickly becomes apparent that most criticism of originalism depends on
substantial distance from ratification. Consider the objection that
following ancient judgments defeats today's democratic will or that

historical investigation becomes more difficult as time passes. True,
certain objections to making decisions on originalist grounds can be
pushed still further, and I will suggest that originalist decision-making is
10 See Richard Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 109 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 44-47) (arguing that originalism can satisfy a democratic
objective only shortly after enactment); infra note 155 (discussing Primus). For earlier work
reaching similar conclusions, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 205, 229 & n.94 (1980) (referring to a form of nonoriginalism in which the presumptive force of text and history is "defeasible over time in the light
of changing experiences and perceptions"); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and
Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1815-20
(1997) (arguing that, even when a court faces a paradigm case that inspired an amendment, "the
strength of originalist arguments diminishes over time"); Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 509, 512 (1996) (recommending contemporary conventional meaning
over original meaning when they diverge over time); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common
Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1752-54 (2003) (arguing that it may be
appropriate to start with originalist interpretation but to employ other methods as time passes); cf
Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 (1981) ("[I]t would
be an intuitive, widely shared premise that the supreme court in 1800 should have accorded
interpretive primacy to original intent."); Terrance Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation, 79
MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1063 (1980) ("The original meaning of the document is not abandoned at a
single moment, but gradually.").
I1 See infra Part 1V.D. 1 (discussing possible incentives for Article V lawmaking).
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1299 2008-2009
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sometimes inappropriate even in the wake of ratification. Regardless,
originalist decision-making would be most powerfully defended on
justifications that are insensitive to time lags. But often no such defense
is possible. Several popular arguments for originalism do run headlong
into time-related objections or, if they do not, they are problematic for
other reasons.
The closing sections of the Article experiment with other
justifications for a strong judicial originalism that lasts. I spotlight two.
One argument is comfortably logical, albeit largely overlooked, while
the other is unorthodox. The first justification involves ex ante
incentives. The supposition is that future law reformers might favor the
politics of amendment-making over litigation if the judiciary starts
holding to a strong form of originalism. This justification is hobbled by
empirical uncertainties, but it should be attractive in principle to some.
The alternative justification involves randomization. Within a limited
domain of issues, perhaps a version of originalism can be defended as a
culturally acceptable substitute for settling disputes by random
selection. If refashioned into a quick take on history, originalism can
amount to throwing dice on supreme law. Applying history to
contemporary disputes can be somewhat arbitrary, yet a kind of
arbitrariness is perfectly rational in some decision situations. This
revision of originalism has a limited scope and major weaknesses. But
my goal is to explore the possibilities for originalist inquiry in
constitutional adjudication, whether or not the arguments track the
commitments of today's originalist movement.
Part I of the Article is a diagnosis. It introduces the interpretation
and adjudication lags, along with thoughts on their dynamics. Included
is a weighted average age for the Constitution and a measure of the
adjudication lag for Article V amendments. Part II is analytical. It
charts possible and plausible trajectories for originalism's strength in
constitutional decision-making over time. It then identifies the Court's
first encounters with Article V amendments, characterizes the variety of
reasoning on display, and briefly reviews trends thereafter in several
doctrinal fields. Parts III and IV are normative. They discuss timeoriented critiques of originalism, defend historiography against the
threats of age, and then develop pro-history arguments least likely to
degrade with time. I close by exploring justifications founded on
incentives and randomization, as well as the premises on which they
depend.
I.

TIME LAGS IN SUPREME LAW

Insofar as one wants to enforce the Constitution of the United
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1300 2008-2009
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States, time lags become hardwired into supreme law. This is true in
two senses. First, there always will be a growing temporal gap between
ratification of a particular word string and its interpretation.
Interpretation lags are unavoidable and affect all interpreters, but the
underlying reasons for the length of these gaps are not so clear. Second,
there often will be a substantial temporal gap between ratification and a
judge's first attempt to understand ratified text. Different decisionmakers enter the interpretive scene at different moments. For the
Supreme Court, the timing of its entrance has varied greatly across
different bits of constitutional text, but a multi-decade delay is typical. I
explain the basis for these observations in this Part.
A.

The InterpretationLag and Its Dynamics

The Constitution's words are aging. Instead of a continuous
process of textual updating, Article V amendments are often relatively
narrow interventions, and they usually arrive with significant delays
between them (Figure 1). There have been only six recognized Article
V amendments since Franklin Roosevelt's first term as President.
Although 40% of the document's words were added after 1789, not
much more than 25% of those additions occurred after 1933. The words
ratified in 1789 were 219 years old in 2008, which is not dramatically
higher than the predicted age of a randomly selected word in the
amended document: 178 years old. At times, enough text has been
added to seriously alter the rate of increase. But the document's
weighted average age has been increasing fairly steadily since 1789
(Figure 2).12

12 The weighted average age of the document is the sum of the ages of each part of the text,
adjusted according to the fraction of the total text that each part represents in a given year. For
example, the weighted average age of the document in 1795 was (6 years of age for the original
Constitution) * (4,379 words in the original Constitution/4,861 total words in 1795)) + (4 years
of age for the Bill of Rights * (482 words in the Bill of Rights/4,861 total words in 1795)) = 5.8
years. A longer note on methodology is available from the author on request.
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Figure 1: Additions to the Constitution of the United States, in Words
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Figure 2: The Age of the Constitution of the United States
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The upshot is that anyone interpreting the document is most likely
adverting to text enacted generations earlier. This point is generally
understood, but the reasons for an aging constitutional text are not
settled. The immediate causes are, of course, retention of the document
as law coupled with a low Article V amendment rate and the absence of
large-scale revision through that process. The debatable question is
why, exactly, the use of Article V has been rare and modest. A growing
empirical literature attempts to answer such causation questions. 13 But
the answers are not conclusive, and the simplest explanations are not
plainly best.
One might begin by supposing that the Article V amendment rate
is a function of (1) status quo satisfaction levels, (2) the formal rules for
amendment and (3) the alternatives for achieving the same or similar
outcomes, including new understandings of existing text. With high
satisfaction levels, extremely demanding amendment rules, and
functional alternatives to address any remaining complaints with the
legal status quo, one should expect few or no formal amendments. At
the opposite extremes, one might predict repeated or extensive
amendments revising nearly every element of supreme law. Other
combinations suggest additional possibilities: low satisfaction levels
along with demanding amendment rules and no functional alternatives
might lead people to simply disregard the document. But the pattern
under consideration here is the limited use of Article V despite
continued public respect for the document.
Genuine popular satisfaction is not a complete explanation for the
Article V amendment rate. We can expect satisfaction to fluctuate, and
there is no guarantee that low satisfaction yields amendments. Periods
of rather intense demand for law reform have not always been reflected
in amendments: the political victories of Jacksonian Democracy, the
New Deal, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Nixon and Reagan
coalitions are possible illustrations. 14 Further, the document has

13 The seminal work is Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of ConstitutionalAmendment, in
RESPONDING

TO

IMPERFECTION:

THE

THEORY

AND

PRACTICE

OF

CONSTITUTIONAL

AMENDMENT 237, 254-62 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (finding that shorter constitutions and
higher estimated difficultly of the amendment process are correlated with falling amendment
rates); see also John Ferejohn, The Politicsof Imperfection: The Amendment of Constitutions, 22

LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 501, 523 (1997) (concluding that the key variable in amendment rates is
special legislative voting requirements, not public referenda or state-level ratification); Bjorn E.
Rasch & Roger D. Congleton, Amendment Procedures and Constitutional Stability, in
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC POLICY: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 319,

333-35 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 2006) (studying OECD countries and
concluding, in contrast, that "multiple decisions with voter involvement" tend to decrease

amendment rates rather than special legislative majorities).
14 See generally Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living
Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1749-50 (2007) (arguing that the document does not

reflect modem nationalistic values).
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become a national icon,5 which can strangely dampen the use of its
own Article V process. We can find at least one likely case of Article V
allergy. As congressional debate over a twelfth amendment began in
1802, Federalist Representative Benjamin Huger reportedly "trembled
at the idea of altering [the Constitution], though he was attached to that
part of it which gave the right of altering it.' ' 16 This kind of reverence
might signify elements of path dependence as well. Maintaining an
institution can be judged superior to the risks and costs of
17
transformation, even if the institution is suboptimal in retrospect.
Still, the existence of formal amendments suggests textual changes are
not anathema.
As to formal amendment rules, the veto gates described in Article
V are indeed extraordinary. On its face, the Article V process is more
difficult than the legislative process described in Article I, Section 7,
and it might seem as or more demanding than any constitution in the
world.' 8 The required supermajorities indicate especially high decision
costs to achieve enactment, with the possibility of a few members of
Congress or state legislators holding out for handsome payoffs.
Additional factors must be considered, however. A procedure
might appear onerous without resulting in a low amendment rate or
serious holdout problems. An amendment might be considered more
durable and worth more effort than ordinary legislation. This could
increase amendment attempts as the formal rules become more taxing.
But of course this depends on the time horizon for law reform efforts.
Participants might not care enough about the distant future for durable
Article V victories to be prized. In addition, there is empirical work
indicating that the length of a constitution or the surrounding political
climate, such as one-party dominance, are more important factors in the

15 See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF 3 (1986); cf Max

Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1294, 1298 (1937) (going so far
as to associate certain cultural use of the Constitution with totem, fetish, and cult).
16 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1286 (1802); cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 313, 314 (James

Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (hoping for veneration of government through stability).
17 See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS

10-24 (2004); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 206-08 (1995) (categorizing claims that an initial decision was
suboptimal based on whether or not a better choice was feasibly recognizable).
18 See generally Lutz, supra note 13, at 256-61 & tbl. 11 (comparing 30 national
constitutions and finding the U.S Constitution second-most difficult to amend, based on an index
of indicators assembled from U.S. state experience); Janice C. May, State Constitutional
Developments in 2003, in 36 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 6 tbl. B (2004) (explaining the

processes for amending U.S. state constitutions). Perhaps the addition of state legislatures and
members of Congress over time has made Article V more difficult to use in 2008 compared to
1789. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL

FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 112 (1962) (theorizing a rise in per capita
bargaining costs under the same voting rule as decision-makers increase).
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amendment rate than the formalities of process. 19 The United States has
rarely experienced partisan political dominance across national and state
institutions, and the Constitution is a relatively concise document with
significant generalities.
Another possible factor is the availability of alternatives. Other
avenues for change might be roughly as good as, and easier to
accomplish than, Article V lawmaking under present circumstances. It
is worth emphasizing that alternatives can reduce the demand for formal
amendments whether or not Article V lawmaking is highly valued.
Perhaps altering constitutional text does achieve the deepest available
victory; the document's advertisement of "supreme" law in Article VI
suggests as much. Yet we know enough about written constitutions to
understand that new paper does not necessarily mean new practices or
lasting social change. The decades after Reconstruction are evidence of
this. There must be living human will to make legal texts relevant, and
those who want change for the long run will not necessarily prefer
Article V amendments to so-called ordinary law joined with a political
coalition to keep it stable. Thus, alternatives to formal constitutional
amendment might be attractive because they achieve adequately
significant change, or because Article V cannot be depended upon to do
SO.20

But uncertainty surrounds the magnitude of this influence as well.
There is reason to deny that Article V has been effectively duplicated.
Different routes to change have different features, and they present
different opportunities for reversal. Supreme Court interpretations of
the Constitution are styled as final renderings of supreme law reversible
by Article V amendment, but they also can be reversed by a subsequent
Court decision. 21 They are thus vulnerable to personnel changes, if
nothing else. 22 The text of the Constitution cannot be formally altered
by Court decision. Of course, constitutional text may be misunderstood
19 See Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, American Civil Law Origins: Implicationsfor State
Constitutions, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 62, 64, 74-75 (2005) (downplaying formal amendment
rules after accounting for partisan political competition, then stressing a statistically significant
link from a state's civil law tradition to a relatively high amendment rate); Lutz, supra note 13, at
247 (correlating document length with amendment rate); see also Ferejohn, supra note 13, at 524
(critiquing emphasis on formal amendment rules).
20 See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of ConstitutionalAmendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457, 1458-64 (2001) (arguing Article V amendments have been neither necessary nor sufficient
for serious change).
21 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1997) (recognizing the possibility of
Article V override and reiterating that stare decisis is softer in constitutional adjudication).
22 See HENRY J. ABRAHAM,

JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 3 (5th ed. 2008)

(discussing ideological compatibility in the nomination decision); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Variable
Voting Behavior on the Supreme Court: A PreliminaryAnalysis and Research Framework, 25
JUST. SYS. J. 57, 62 (2004) (indicating that, in cases where precedent was explicitly overruled,
justices were most likely to stick with their initial position, but emphasizing that 30% of the
studied votes were to overrule precedent that the justice in question had helped set).
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or misused by the judiciary, and courts might nevertheless receive
respect when they declare constitutional meaning. Still, constitutional
text can have influence beyond the courtroom.
It might affect
arguments and behavior even if, for purposes of litigation, courts
sometimes have the power to ignore its meaning. 23 Of similar
importance are the sociopolitical consequences associated with each
method of change. Using the formal amendment process implicates a
distinct set of actors and actions, and one should expect different effects
on the political environment. Even if adjudication can produce similar
effects on politics, which is doubtful, 24 and even if Article V
movements influence judicial understanding of the Constitution, which
is almost certainly true on occasion, 25 it would be a mistake to equate
these two paths.
The difference, however, is a matter of degree.
Ordinary
legislation, regulation, private ordering and litigation may be acceptable
in light of Article V's procedural hurdles and weaknesses. To be clear,
some of these alternatives do not purport to generate supreme law.
Change advocates may accept this and settle for something less than
nominally supreme federal law when they can do so consistently with
the document as interpreted. For instance, those who want states to
license cross-sex and not same-sex marriage might prefer a federal
constitutional amendment to that effect, yet satisfy themselves with
changes in state constitutional law. 26 This migration away from
supreme law is surely real and interesting, but perhaps less controversial
than other movements.
Another effort triggers complaints of constitutional perversion:
when change advocates seek reform without using Article V and their
objective is inconsistent with the document as understood by some set

23 See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED

POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 2 (1999) ("Not everything that courts do is consistent
with the ideal of interpretation. Not everything that elaborates constitutional meaning is
interpretation.").
24 See Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan, When the Supreme Court Decides, Does the Public
Follow? 2-3 (July 5, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssm.com/abstract-998597 (using
survey research and finding no effect or a small effect on public opinion from learning about the
Court's resistance to regulation of abortion, flagburning, and sodomy); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1830 (2005) (collecting studies
finding little influence on public opinion).
25 See Barry Friedman, Mediated PopularConstitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2602
(2003); Robert C. Post, Foreword:Fashioningthe Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law,
117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) ("[C]onstitutional law and culture are locked in a dialectical
relationship .... ); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitutionfrom a Social
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 302 (2001).
26 Cf Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks to
Federalism in Family Law, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 137, 197-98 (2004) (describing the movement
for state-level cross-sex marriage amendments, but ultimately supporting a federal amendment to
stop "judicial activism" and "lawlessness").
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of interpreters. Few advocates will concede that their goals contradict
the document as properly interpreted, and proving otherwise depends on
the contested notion of "interpretation. '27 Usually they will claim, as
28
Franklin Roosevelt did, that resisters misunderstand the Constitution.
But sometimes those claims will be fairly disputed and a reform
29
movement will nonetheless channel resources away from Article V.
Among the more controversial of these workarounds is judicial
updating. Change advocates might turn to the courts for what amounts
to a revision of supreme law. This can have more than one effect on
other forums. A possibility is that litigation ultimately energizes nonjudicial political action. Successful litigation might clear the way for
politics by other means, as when the Supreme Court was urged to
modify its understanding of congressional authority during the New
Deal. 30 Or it could be part of a campaign to trump politics-as-usual, as
when the Court was asked to repudiate racial segregation in public
schools. 3 1 Either way, litigation can be a rough substitute for supreme
lawmaking through Article V-not a categorically lower-order
alternative that is accepted by all as reversible through ordinary
lawmaking.
As well, such litigation could reduce the expected value of Article
V amendments. Those amendments might be subject to creative
reinterpretation in the future to serve new interests. To the extent
change advocates have lengthy time horizons, the formal amendment
rate could spiral downward.
The relationship between judicial review and amendment rates is
an empirical question with implications for choosing an interpretive
method. 32 Yet our understanding of the relationship is notably
unsophisticated.
Educated guesswork might suggest an inverse

27 See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been
Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 13, at 13, 25-36; infra Part III.A.
28 See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary (Mar. 9,
1937), availableat http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/030937.html ("we must find a way to take
an appeal from the Supreme Court to the Constitution itself.").
29 Roosevelt considered an Article V effort, but decided against it. See William E.
Leuchtenburg, The Origins ofFranklinD. Roosevelt's 'Court-Packing'Plan,1966 SUP. CT. REV.
347, 362-65, 384-86 (noting, inter alia, drafting difficulties, delay, expected opposition from
business interests and lawyers, and judicial interpretation thereafter); see also 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 20-25 (1998)

(describing non-Article V

constitutional moments involving national political confrontations); LARRY KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW ch. 1 (2004)

(examining a tradition of popular influence on constitutional meaning).
30 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942) (testing federal regulation by
the purportedly substantial effect of its subject on interstate commerce).
31 See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (relying on the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause to oppose racial segregation in D.C. public schools).
32 See infra Part IV.D. 1 (discussing incentives-based justifications for originalism).
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relationship, something to "take on faith" for the time being, but
conventional wisdom is vulnerable to sustained investigation. 33 It could
be that the amendment rate would be equally low if no substantially
similar alternatives to Article V existed. It is also possible that Article
V alternatives prevented the need for, and risks of, a full-blown
rewriting of the Constitution. Perhaps the most that can be said with
confidence is that several factors-adequate satisfaction with supreme
law allied with the document's status as a national icon, the practical
difficulty in surviving the amendment process in ordinary times given
the political environment, and the feasible alternatives including judicial
interpretation-probably work together to depress the modem Article V
amendment rate.
B.

The Adjudication Lag and Its Dynamics

The adjudication lag is different. It directs attention to one
audience for the document: judges resolving disputes. The adjudication
lag measures the time between ratification of constitutional text and the
use of that text by courts. There might not be anything independently
interesting about it if courts were always interpreting constitutional text
alongside other decision-makers.
But they do not. Judges are
interpretation-laggards.
Accurately measuring the adjudication lag for all clauses in the
document and for all courts in the United States would be burdensome.
Existing search engines cannot be relied on to find the first instance of
judicial "interpretation" without additional human judgment.
Nevertheless, we can make meaningful progress by studying only
Article V amendments and only Supreme Court opinions.

33 Ferejohn, supra note 13, at 525.
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Figure 3: Variance in the Adjudication Lag
forAmendments at the Supreme Court, in Years
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* The Twentieth, Twenty-Third, and Twenty-Seventh Amendments have not yet been
interpreted by the Supreme Court as of 2008. The calculation of a 42-year average
treats these three Amendments as if they had been interpreted in 2008.
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Doing so yields the following result: Since 1791, the average lag
between ratification of an amendment and its interpretation by the Court
has been approximately 40 years. 34 To make this calculation, cases
were searched for interpretation by a member of the majority coalition
on the judgment.
"Interpretation" was understood liberally.
Meaningful information about the understanding of an amendment was
sufficient; reasoned elaboration of textual meaning was not required.
For instance, The Steel Seizure Case was counted as ending the
adjudication lag for the Third Amendment because Justice Jackson's
concurrence pointed to the Amendment during his broader discussion of
the balance of authority between the President and Congress. 35
Furthermore, the calculation is based on opinions interpreting any part
of an amendment. Thus Supreme Court interpretation of the Petition
Clause in 187536 ends the adjudication lag for the First Amendment as a
whole. In this respect, the duration of adjudication lags is arguably
understated.
Regardless, it is clear that the adjudication lag varies tremendously
across constitutional text (Figure 3). For some amendments, the lag is
vanishingly short-just one month for the Eleventh Amendment. For
others, it lasts decades-162 years for the Third Amendment. For yet
others, the adjudication lag is still mounting. 37 The forces that yield
adjudication lags, moreover, are not necessarily stable over time. The
average lag drops below 23 years for the Eleventh through TwentySeventh Amendments. This could be the result of more than chance.
There is a degree of subjectivity in these results, however. Aside
from the definition of interpretation and its application, the focus on
ratification of Article V amendments is partly a matter of convenience.
Neither individual clauses within amendments nor the original
document is studied here, and one might be interested in the time lag
between any novel constitutional argument and judicial adjudication. A
formal amendment need not be the genesis of a claim about supreme
law. Consider natural law, fundamental rights, or substantive due
process arguments. Some early advocates indicated that the document
reflected, without exhausting, principles that ought to constrain

34 An Appendix to this Article lists the cases on which this calculation relies. It also lists the
first citation of each amendment in a majority coalition opinion. This helps set a lower bound on
the interpretation lag. The average "citation lag" in the Supreme Court is about 35 years.
35 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
36 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
37 The Twentieth, Twenty-Third, and Twenty-Seventh Amendments are treated as if they had
been interpreted by the Court in 2008. They have not yet been interpreted. This is a rightcensored data issue, which has not been addressed with hazard rates. See JANET M. BoxSTEFFENSMEIER & BRADFORD S. JONES, EVENT HISTORY MODELING: A GUIDE FOR SOCIAL
SCIENTISTS 15-20 (2004).
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government action. 38 Excessive concentration on one text can miss
these intellectual streams. Likewise, it might be useful to measure the
lag between any judicial opinion referring to historical sources and the
age of those sources. The Court's rulings on state 'sovereign immunity
are now disconnected from particular clauses of the document, 39 but this
does not mean that the Court is ignoring history.
Nevertheless, the variance in adjudication lags is real, and the lag
from ratification to interpretation can reach a century or more. Consider
the Supreme Court's experiences with the Eleventh and Twelfth
Amendments. Both were ratified more than 200 years ago but their
adjudication lags are radically different. The Eleventh Amendment's
constraint on federal court jurisdiction was addressed one month after
its ratification was proclaimed by the President. 40
In 1798,
Hollingsworth v.

Virginia4'

swiftly rejected arguments that the

Amendment was not properly ratified and that its constraint should not
apply to pending cases. 42 The Twelfth Amendment, in contrast, was not
even cited by the Supreme Court until 1892. 43 And the Court did not
interpret the Twelfth until Ray v. Blair,44 a full 148 years after
ratification.
Variance in the adjudication lag is explicable once recognized.
Constitutional provisions do not all share the same character. Some are
prime candidates for judicial use: some text is, or becomes, vague; 45
some text implicates moral choices and threatens existing interests, as
with the Reconstruction Amendments; and some text is directed at
judges, such as Article III. But many other provisions do not
necessarily foretell litigation.
Some provisions sunset. 46 Some
provisions are little more than coordination devices, such as the
requirement that Congress assemble at least once a year on a default
date at high noon. 47 Even the facially plausible candidates for litigation
will not always be interpreted by the courts immediately. A real-world
38 See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1335-38 (3d. ed.
2000) (describing the development of such arguments); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders'
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1127-28 (1987) (offering a history of"multiple
sources of fundamental law").
39 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002)
(describing the Eleventh Amendment as "but one particular exemplification" of state sovereign

immunity).
40 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED

YEARS, 1789-1888, at 20 (1985).
41 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378 (1798).
42 See id. at 379-82 (describing attorney arguments and the Court's disposition).
43 See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 26 (1892).
44 343 U.S. 214, 228-31 (1952).
45 See Schauer, supra note 4, at 400-07 (offering clarity as an explanation for dormancy).
46 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (setting a sunset involving regulation of the slave
trade); id. art. V (same).

47 See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2.
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controversy must arise that is arguably related to the text. Think about
the Bill of Rights while the federal government's domestic regulatory
presence was in its infancy. Without an exercise of power implicating
48
these amendments, litigation could be avoided.
More broadly, parties must be willing to litigate and courts must be
willing to resolve their claims before adjudication lags end. The federal
constitutional system lacks an advisory opinion process. Furthermore,
judges have always had devices for avoiding issues, none more than
Supreme Court justices. Their docket was declared almost entirely
discretionary by statute in 1988 and they exercised substantial discretion
long before then. 49 Judges might be shy about offering an opinion in
one timeframe, even if they become self-assured later on. 50 On the
other side, judges might indicate their interest in taking up unlitigated
constitutional claims. 51 Either way, the judicial agenda will be set by
more than the character of constitutional clauses. A combination of
judicial proclivity and litigant interest will help determine when
adjudication lags end.
Many variables are in play but some points are clear. In our
system, nonjudicial actors bear initial responsibility for understanding
the Constitution's meaning.
At least when the addressees of
constitutional text are not judges, others will work with the text before
even the most aggressive court speaks. Adjudication does not start and
finish quickly enough to preempt debate elsewhere. As well, bits of text
will lurk outside the courtroom only to emerge decades after
ratification. Even if Article V is never used again, we are still bound to
witness additional adjudication lags ending. Courts have yet to render
meaning from all of the document's clauses. And it is anyone's guess
how the document's reference to Letters of Marque and Reprisal might
someday influence the legal status of the war on terror.52 This leads to
48 Accord Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to
Politics,in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 13, at 37, 45, 49.
49 See, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT 274-75, 295-303 (1991); Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Ducking
Trouble: Congressionally-InducedSelection Bias in the Supreme Court's Agenda 3, 8-10, 34-35
(Dec. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (finding that congressional
preferences influenced probability of Supreme Court review of federal statutes enacted from 1987
to 2001, though perhaps due to party litigation decisions).
50 See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation:Decisionmaking in the Supreme
Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 62-66 (1979) (describing internal Court deliberations on how
to handle Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80 (1955) (upholding an anti-miscegenation law)).
51 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937-39 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(relying on the Tenth Amendment but raising a Second Amendment argument).
52 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. For an effort to shape understanding of war-related
authority with the Letters Clause, see Michael D. Ramsey, Text and History in the War Powers
Debate: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1685, 1707 (2002) ("The Marque and
Reprisal Clause gives Congress authority over a limited form of war, while the Declare War
Clause gives Congress control over broader forms of war."); John C. Yoo, War and the
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three further observations about adjudication lags.
First, the phenomenon is not simply a function of a low
amendment rate. Adjudication lags could persist even if the document
were amended every year, assuming that the content of amendments
would not radically change.
There is no assurance that new
constitutional text will make its way into the court system swiftly.
Nonetheless, a low amendment rate reduces the likelihood of short
adjudication lags ending in the present time period. It means fewer
fresh targets. Understandably, then, scholars tend to concentrate on
interpretation after long lags. Alternatively, a high amendment rate
might resolve disputes without litigation. Elements of the Bill of Rights
suggest an illustration. One rationale for the Bill was to calm fears
about the intended scope of congressional authority. 53 Still, it is
unrealistic to expect that an amendment process, no matter how lax, will
eliminate the likelihood of litigation in a system that accepts some form
of judicial review.
A second observation goes to practical consequences.
The
interpretation and adjudication lags are associated with different
decision environments with different available information.
By
definition, no judicial decisions are available until the adjudication lag
runs out. Given enough time, however, parts of the document will be
the subject of cripplingly large commentary from the courts. In a
system that places any weight on the constitutional opinion of judges,
past court decisions will have some influence on future outcomes. Long
interpretation lags, therefore, might present the opportunity to settle
questions by reference to precedent. In contrast, non-judicial influences
are likely to build over time regardless.
Populations change,
preferences shift, facts and technology evolve, patterns of behavior
solidify into traditions and self-reinforcing systems. 54 If courts are
taken seriously and if they offer opinions on constitutional meaning
quickly, then judicial opinion will become part of the influence on
behavior as the interpretation lag grows. But if courts act more slowly,
if they intervene only after a lengthy lag, they will more likely face
high-magnitude changes and the accompanying practical impediments
to judicial influence.
An example is Ray v. Blair,55 which involved presidential elector
freedom.
Political parties had been effectively dictating elector
behavior long before Ray was decided in 1952. In fact, presidential
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639, 1667-68 (2002) (reading both clauses, to the
contrary, as granting Congress power to characterize legal status rather than to initiate action).
53 See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 19-43 (1999) (discussing the
enumerated powers assurance and its abandonment by supporters of a Bill of Rights).
54 See, e.g., PIERSON, supra note 17, at 10, 24 (discussing path dependence in politics through
setup costs, learning effects, network effects, and expectation adaptation).
55 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
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electors might not have ever exercised much independent judgment. 56
Despite these traditions, a candidate for elector sought greater freedom
to deliberate than his state and party preferred. He contended that those
who originally designed the Electoral College would not have tolerated
elector pledges to alienate their judgment to a national party
convention. 57 In these long-distance encounters with constitutional text,
how should responsible judges behave? For judicial encounters closer
in time to ratification, is the conscientious judge obligated to act
differently than the judge who never had the opportunity to intervene
when the text was young? Should judges time their interventions with
any such difference in mind, if they have the option? 58 These are the
sorts of questions explored below.
Third and finally, constitutional interpretation cannot be fully
separated from other types of interpretation. Whenever decision-makers
look to history, similar issues surface. Think about District of Columbia
v. Heller, which invoked the Second Amendment to vindicate a
qualified right to possess a handgun in one's home for self-defense. 59
The Amendment is about 217 years old, but the last time the Court had
directly confronted a claim under the Amendment was nearly 70 years
prior.60 This precedent has its own historical context and it was
followed by a tradition outside the courts. In fact, the District of
Columbia handgun regulation at issue was itself written over 30 years
ago. 61 Decision-makers must determine whether their approach to an
information source ought to be influenced by the distance between the
time of decision and the creation of the source-whether the source is
constitutional text, a statute, a treaty, a regulation, an executive order, a
judicial opinion, evidence of a tradition, and so forth. Most decisionmakers will not want to age discriminate against all of these sources, but
the degree to which age should matter is an unavoidable judgment.
56 See id. at 229 n. 16; EDWARD STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY FROM 1788 TO

1897, at 51 (rev. ed. 1928) (quoting a Federalist partisan who criticized a 1796 elector for
"think[ing]" rather than "act[ing]").
57 Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961) (Alexander Hamilton) (indicating that electors would engage in a "complicated...
investigation" and act "under circumstances favorable to deliberation"), with Ray, 343 U.S. at
228-30 (permitting a state party to require that primary candidates for elector make such a
pledge).

58 Note a companionship between advocating judicial passivity, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS ch. 4 (1962),

and advocating narrow judicial judgments or deferential judicial attitudes, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 17, 21 (1999).

In

practical terms, delayed judicial intervention might amount to judicial minimalism or deference.
59 See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. . -, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821-22 (2008). The
meaning of Heller is, like the Second Amendment, contested.
60 See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).

61 See Brief of Petitioner at 4-6, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (No. 07-290) (describing handgun
data relied on by the D.C. City Council in 1976).
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There are reasons, however, for fixating on the Constitution. A
narrowed focus helps make the discussion more concrete and less
theoretical. We might begin to understand the normative choices and
positive dynamics for supreme law generation, without forgetting that
this situation is analogous to others. Second, the choices in this field are
partly unique. If nothing else, Article V is an oddity. We can expect
something special and perhaps especially important in the interplay
between the formal amendment process, a low amendment rate, and the
alternative methods of creating law.

II.

ORIGINALISM'S TRAJECTORIES

The discussion above identifies two different time lags. Both raise
issues for interpretive methods that rely on historical arguments. Indeed
a large part of the debate over interpretative method and decisionmaking in the courts can be organized around these time-related
questions. The next step is to fill out the options. This Part sketches
some possible and plausible trajectories for the strength of originalism
in decision-making over time, and it begins to investigate how the
Supreme Court has reacted to the time variable in actual constitutional
cases.
A.

The Possibleand the Plausible

"Originalism" has been used to label several distinct ideas. Its
versions are briefly reviewed in Part III.A, below. For now, we can use
the term loosely to encompass a range of historical arguments about the
meaning of constitutional text. These arguments might target drafter
intent, or ratifier understanding, or public meaning, or some other fact
question for the purpose of illuminating textual meaning at the time of
adoption. Clearly excluded are bald arguments about the best meaning
according to present needs. Tradition and practice after ratification are
likewise excluded, unless specifically used to understand meaning at the
point of ratification. But this leaves room for many historical sources
and arguments in Supreme Court opinions that can all be counted as
originalist. Although a narrower definition of originalism would better
fit today's intellectual trends, it might drastically reduce the number of
Court opinions available for analysis.
Whichever version of originalism ought to be prioritized,
constitutional decision-makers must assign it a strength value in relation
to other considerations. This is true whether one believes that nothing
but originalism qualifies as "interpretation" or whether that term is
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defined capaciously enough to include other activities. Because the
strength value for originalism in decision-making could change over
time, there are an infinite number of trajectories that originalism's
influence might follow. Everything depends on how temporal distance
from ratification might affect the normative arguments for and against
the use of originalist inquiry in decisions that affect people. Begin by
considering the following trajectories:
(1) Loyal

(2) Skeptical

high
strength

low
strength
t100

t1

(3) Compromise

(4) Counterintuitive

high
strength

-

-

/
/

/
/

low
strength
t100

tI

The first pair of trajectories is insensitive to the passage of time.
Originalism sustains its strength level regardless of the distance between
ratification (ti) and subsequent time periods.
Opposition to the
relevance of time does not depend on support for originalist methods.
One can believe that the post-ratification date of interpretation is
irrelevant and either dogmatically support originalism or instead deny
its value.
Both positions are, however, extreme. To defend the loyal curve,
no amount of progress in understanding human affairs and no degree of
change in technology, sociology, morality, economics, politics or
international relations can affect the overriding influence of originalism.
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One would have to remain deeply resistant to legal change and think
such stasis possible, or believe the world does not actually change in
important ways, or have total faith in the formal amendment process, or
possess confidence that past constitutional decisions will always
incorporate adequate flexibility to serve contemporary needs. 62 To
defend the skeptical curve, originalism must be repudiated by the Court
no matter how static the world, clear the sentiment on constitutional
meaning or close in time to ratification. The Court would be required,
on the afternoon of ratification, to interpret constitutional text without
relying at all on originalist inquiries. This probably requires equally
heroic assumptions or unconventional values.
The other pair of trajectories represents an emerging compromise
for originalism's strength, along with a counterintuitive alternative. The
compromise curve shows originalism at the apex of its strength when
decision-makers are close in time to ratification, and then a negative
slope for subsequent time periods as originalism fades. The intuition is
that originalist inquiries at the Supreme Court are more desirable, more
feasible, and perhaps inevitable when constitutional text has just been
ratified. Thereafter, the justifications and pressures pointing toward
originalism dwindle. The optimal shape of this curve is open to debate,
63
but several scholars suggest this moderated position on originalism.
Hence the issue that divides many theorists is originalism's strength at
t1oo, not at ti.
At least theoretically, this compromise trajectory can be turned
upside down. On this option, originalism begins weakly and gains
strength in decision-making with time. No one appears to advocate this
trajectory as a normative matter.64 It might well show an inexplicably
delayed onset of nostalgia for antiquated decisions. But on certain
conditions and for certain situations, a move from weaker to stronger
65
originalism in the judiciary is defensible. Or so I shall suggest.

Before proceeding, two qualifications should be noted. First, time
is only a proxy. Its passage after ratification indicates that originalism's
desirability or feasibility might have to be reconsidered, without
showing exactly why. Plotting a trajectory for originalism's strength is
therefore difficult, even if we are solely interested in the normative
question. Second, a sound normative judgment requires a confrontation
with judicial precedent. After the adjudication lag ends, precedent
62 Originalist inquiry might yield flexibility on these points, but that would be a result of good
fortune rather than a judgment at t1o0 that originalism should be moderated.
63 See supra note 10 (collecting sources).
64 The counterintuitive curve might accurately describe the ebb and flow of originalist
argument at the Supreme Court for certain parts of the document. Such a trend can be the result
of, for example, newly appointed justices. Here I treat such influences as contributing to a
positive account of originalism's strength, rather than a justification for those trajectories.
65 See infra Part III.D.4 (discussing randomization).
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might rightly alter the shape of originalism's curve. 66 To the extent
adjudication lags are unpredictable, settling on a preferable trajectory
for originalism in the abstract becomes that much more challenging.
B.

Supreme Court Practice

How have courts actually used originalism over time? This
question can be answered only with a panoramic content analysis of
judicial opinions, which has not been done. If it were done, it would
reveal arguments made for public consumption and not necessarily true
motivating forces. And even if opinions do reveal reasons, interpretive
method can be opaque. Adverting to history could be a search for
wisdom or universal truths, while relying on case law could be
functionally originalist if the precedent is grounded in originalism.
Hence the value of an exhaustive inquiry into written opinions might
exceed the cost of the effort.
A truncated review of Supreme Court cases is nonetheless useful.
It provides real-world examples of the trajectories illustrated above. In
addition, it can test a supposition about Court behavior: that originalism
is likely to be the dominant rhetorical strategy, and perhaps the only
feasible basis for decision, when opinions are rendered shortly after
ratification. But it turns out that originalist arguments are not exclusive
in those time periods. Nor do originalist arguments always disappear
after constitutional text ages. Instead, originalism's popularity seems to
have followed influences largely unrelated to the logic of time lags.
1.

First Encounters with Text

One strategy for understanding the relationship between time and
originalism is to scrutinize the end of adjudication lags. By isolating
opinions in which the Supreme Court first interprets constitutional text,
66 Use of precedent-based arguments to defuse originalist inquiries is commonplace. See,
e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 570, 577-81 (2001) (arguing that precedent is itself often

accepted as legitimate law). But note that the strength of originalist-like methods might increase
based on judicial precedent. This would happen if (1) the precedent should be taken seriously for

a non-originalist reason and (2) the precedent directs subsequent judges to undertake historical
inquiry. Just as originalist interpretation theoretically can direct judges to make contemporary
moral judgments, non-originalist sources theoretically can direct judges to make historical
inquiries. Yet these are distinct analytical routes. For one thing, originalism and non-originalism
offer different ways for revising initial impressions. A strong originalist should want better
historical argument before reversing her historical judgment that moral reasoning is required by
the Constitution, while a common-law constitutionalist might test his commitment to precedentsupported historical inquiry against the length of this judicial tradition and right reason.
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the availability of on-point judicial precedent is eliminated and
originalism could become more attractive. This is especially true for
judicial interpretation shortly after ratification.
According to
conventional wisdom, anyway, originalism should dominate in this
context if nowhere else. The end of long adjudication lags might be
informative as well. Although this class of cases also minimizes the
role of precedent, here the Court must assess the relevance of nonjudicial events and practices since ratification. Unfortunately, only a
small number of cases fit these categories (the result of a low
amendment rate). And it would be best to know the strength of
originalism in other constitutional cases decided at similar times. There
might be interpretive epochs more influential than the length of
adjudication lags, even if it is not quite true that "the most important
fact about any case is its date."'67 Given these limitations, the analysis
can be relatively concise.
a.

Short lags

Ten of the Supreme Court's adjudication lags have ended within
10 years of an amendment's ratification. Often an originalist element is
fairly apparent. 68 Consider the Warren Court's first interpretation of the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which declares that the right to vote in
federal elections "shall not be denied or abridged ...by reason of
failure to pay any poll tax or other tax." The justices of this era were
known to offer historical arguments in constitutional cases, 69 but they
are not known for a commitment to originalism. Yet the uncelebrated
case of Harman v. Forssenius,70 decided one year after the
Amendment's ratification, is heavy with originalist themes. The Court
held that Virginia could not offer prospective federal voters a choice
among paying back poll taxes, annually filing a certificate of residency,
or not voting. Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court begins with
the text of the Amendment, it summarizes the forerunning congressional
debates over poll taxes, and it highlights the expressed concerns of

67 L.H. LaRue, ConstitutionalLaw and Constitutional History, 36 BUFF. L. REv. 373, 373
(1987).
68 See United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 222-23, 226 (1934) (referring to what "the

people" accomplished in the Twenty-First Amendment); Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S.
232, 250, 252-53 (1921) (relying on the drafting history of the Seventeenth Amendment);
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 10-21 (1916) (using Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), as context for understanding the Sixteenth Amendment).

Slaughter-House Cases ended the adjudication lag for two Amendments. See 83 U.S. 36, 71-72,
77-78 (1873) (ascertaining a general purpose for the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments).
69 See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
70 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
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proponents to create an interpretive background. 71
We cannot confidently say that Harman is entirely originalist. The
opinion cites precedent along with the Amendment's text for the
proposition that Virginia's certificate alternative was an invalid penalty
on a right. 72 And it relies on case law to reject, as insufficiently urgent,
the Commonwealth's argument from administrative necessity. 73 Now,
even these passages might be consistent with a form of originalism; one
could say that the referenced case law indicated a well-understood
background against which the Constitution was amended in 1964. But
the opinion itself is unclear on this point. The safest conclusion is that
the Warren Court was willing to use originalist themes close in time to
ratification, but that originalism is probably not a complete account of
either the rhetoric of Harman or the underlying reasons for the
judgment. It is not as if the Virginia statute accorded with the Court's
general attitude toward burdens on voting imposed by Southern states.
Lack of clarity in interpretive method characterizes other cases in
this set. Consider the startling Prohibition Era case of Rhode Island v.
Palmer,74 which was decided within a year of the Eighteenth
Amendment's ratification. Without explanation, the majority offered no
fewer than eleven conclusions on the validity and meaning of the
Amendment. 75
The conclusions were presented in numbered
paragraphs, like a syllabus without the customary opinion thereafter.
Some of these holdings were significant. Conclusion 11 was that
Congress had authority to reach beverages containing as little as 0.5%
alcohol by volume. 76 Again, the majority might have used some version
of originalist interpretation to reach these results, or it might have
constructed meaning in the face of vagueness, or it might have made a
pragmatic or policy judgment to free the hands of politics. We cannot
know with confidence.
Reticence is not the only departure from originalist argument
within the ratifying generation. A bolder option is to interpret new text
in conformity with the Court's normative commitments. Here the
77
standout is Osborn v. Nicholson.
Osborn came seven years after the Thirteenth Amendment's
71 See id. at 529, 538-40; see also id. at 540, 543-44 (noting a pre-Amendment concern about
African-American disenfranchisement and racist origins of Virginia's prior poll tax regime).
72 See id. at 540-41.
73 See id. at 542-43 (finding a "lack of necessity" after referencing Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (involving equal protection and voting rights), which was decided after the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment was ratified, and Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1948)
(involving equal protection and escheat of land turning on parental noncitizenship)).
74 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
75 See id. at 384-88 (quoting constitutional text and offering conclusions).
76 See id. at 387-88; see also Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378, 381-82 (1798)
(reporting lawyers' arguments and the bare conclusions of the Court).
77 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1872).
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ratification. It considered how the abolition of slavery might affect the
apportionment of losses among commercial participants in the slave
trade. With thick natural law themes, a majority concluded that the
Amendment should not inhibit a slave seller's demand for payment
from a slave buyer where their contract was formed before the
Amendment. The Court called the protection of such contracts "a
principle of universal jurisprudence. A different rule would shake the
social fabric to its foundations and let in a flood-tide of intolerable
evils."' 78 In light of this normative view, the majority shifted the
interpretive burden to disfavor statutory repeal or the destruction of socalled vested rights. These outcomes would require an implication "so
clear as to be equivalent to an explicit declaration..... .There is
nothing in the language of the amendment which in the slightest degree
warrants the inference that those who framed or those who adopted it
79
intended that such should be its effect."
There is a crosscurrent here. Osborn incorporates an originalist
thought about intentions. Yet this comes after a clear-statement rule is
erected, and this rule is grounded in natural law. While any such
principle of "universal jurisprudence" might be another background
assumption against which amendments are supposed to be drafted,
Osborn seems more assertive than this. In fact, the majority reserved
the question whether it would honor an amendment that explicitly
rearranged such property rights among private parties.
After
mentioning "fundamental principles of the social compact," the majority
remarked: "What would be the effect of an amendment of the National
Constitution reaching so far-if such a thing should occur-it is not
necessary to consider, as no such question is presented in the case
before us." 80
b.

Long lags

If opinions that end adjudication lags swiftly are methodologically
mixed, what about longer delays between ratification and adjudication?
Today the Supreme Court's declarations on constitutional meaning are
so often adorned with judicial precedent that it might take a moment to
recall options other than case law and originalism. But forces beyond
precedent may diminish originalism's strength, and precedent is
unavailable when adjudication lags end.
One standard alternative is deference to the considered judgment of
78 Id. at 662.

79 Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.), in
asserting that a different rule would be "contrary to 'the general principles of law and reason"').
80 Id. at 662-63.
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other institutions. This decision strategy was on display no later than
McCulloch v. Maryland.81

And the Court has not indicated that

deference is due only to the originalist judgments of others. A related
ground for dampening originalism is extended practice outside the
courts. Tradition can be a factor in constitutional adjudication
regardless of whether it informs the Court about original meaning,
understanding, or intent.
To take one example, tradition was overpowering in Ray v. Blair.
Ending the Twelfth Amendment's 148-year adjudication lag, the
majority could not have been much more anti-originalist. They
indicated no interest in resetting the presidential election system to
accord with any hope or understanding in 1789 of independent
deliberation by electors. That life had departed from these designs was
given as a reason for judicial blessing, not intervention. The majority
announced that it would place heavy weight on contemporary practice
backed by tradition-"[t]his long-continued practical interpretation of
the constitutional propriety of an implied or oral pledge of his ballot by
a candidate for elector. ' 82 Although the majority could have believed
that elector independence dwindled so quickly after the founding that
those responsible for the Twelfth Amendment must have ratified the
change, 83 the argument is not clearly and not solely the basis for the
judgment.
Still, the anti-originalist path does not dominate, even in cases
decided many decades after ratification. The most interesting examples
occur shortly before the Lochner era arrived in full force. 84 No long
adjudication lag for an Amendment ended during the heart of the
Lochner period, but Osborn confirms that natural law reasoning was
alive in 1872 and further previews of substantive due process rights
were issued by 1877.85 Yet the Court drew on originalist sources when
it ended two long adjudication lags in this era. These opinions speak to
the First and Eighth Amendments. 86
81 17 U.S. 316, 401-02 (1819). McCulloch ended an adjudication lag for the Tenth
Amendment, and it does intimate an originalist argument on that issue. See id. at 406-07
(contrasting the Amendment with text in the Articles of Confederation).
82 Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229-30 (1952) (noting the contemporary laws of twenty states);
see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY,

1888-1986, at 371 (1990) (charactering Ray as a "sobering reminder of the limited capacity of
law to affect human behavior").
83 See Ray, 343 U.S. at 228 & n. 16 (quoting congressional debate); ef TADAHISA KURODA,
THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT:

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY

REPUBLIC, 1787-1804, at 171-72 (1994) (asserting that the Amendment "in effect recognized the
existence of national political parties").
84 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
85 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125-26, 134 (1877) (rejecting the instant attack on a rate
cap, however); TRIBE, supra note 38, at 1341-52 (detailing the era).
86 To be fair, both Amendments had received glancing attention from the Court without
pressing originalist themes. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (holding
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Wilkerson v. Utah 87 interpreted the Eighth Amendment 87 years
after ratification but nevertheless made space for originalist analysis.
One issue addressed was whether a trial judge could order death by
public shooting as the punishment for first-degree murder. The Court
did cite contemporary military practice in affirming the penalty, 88 but it
also reviewed founding era punishments that supposedly had been
repudiated by the Amendment.8 9 Reynolds v. United States9" is
comparable. It interpreted the Free Exercise Clause in the same year, at
the same temporal distance from ratification, and with significant
reliance on originalist history. 91 The opinion also asserts polygamy's
threat to social order and democracy, and it objects to exemptions from
criminal statutes for religiously motivated conduct, 92 but the Court did
strive to link its views to 1791.
The end of adjudication lags educates us about what is possible, or
at least what was possible, for constitutional argument in the courts.
Without precedent to rely on and close in time to ratification, the Court
often pushed originalist themes. But not exclusively and not always.
Decades after ratification, the picture is not radically different. Several
opinions depart from originalist themes and invoke alternative
considerations, sometimes pointing to events intervening between
ratification and judicial interpretation.
But not always and not
exclusively.
2.

Extended Interpretive Trajectories

With such variability, it should not be surprising to find long-term
interpretive trajectories matching a number of curves for originalism's
strength in decision-making.
The compromise trajectory sketched above, with originalism's
strength declining over time, tracks the path of several doctrinal fields.

that the Petition Clause is not directly applicable to the states); Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S.
475, 479-80 (1866) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the states, but then
concluding, in the alternative, that the Amendment was not violated by imprisoning the defendant
for selling liquor without a license); cf Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1833) (denying
jurisdiction over a sentence and stating, in the alternative, that an excessive fine could not be
shown on the record). These earlier cases are used in my calculation of the adjudication lag
because they provide information on a majority's view of constitutional text. But these cases
offer little or no insight into the Court's preferred method of constitutional interpretation or
argument.
87 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
88 See id. at 134-35.
89 See id. at 134-37.
90 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

91 See id. at 162-65 (focusing on ratification era history, including state law).
92 See id. at 165-66 (citing an academic's opinion).
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The leading candidates for this trajectory are areas of constitutional

argument now immersed in case law. Contemporary analysis of cruel
and unusual punishment, along with the boundaries of religion and its
free exercise, have become largely the domain of common-law
reasoning, 93 regardless of earlier originalist themes and occasional
backtracking. 94 It might be that today's results could be reached with
overtly originalist inquiry, but they tend not to be. And the path back to

originalist arguments in the precedent is a long one.
Other trajectories are present. It is possible to view Speech Clause
doctrine as bumping along on a relatively skeptical curve, with the

occasional spike toward originalism. When Speech Clause complaints
received attention at the Court as a result of World War I related
prosecutions, ratification era history did not seem important to the
justices. 95 The same is usually true today. 96 There are, of course,
important exceptions. 97 But no one familiar with the doctrine would
characterize its originalism as more than episodic.
It is also possible to understand Seventh Amendment arguments as
somewhat consistently tied to history.
The Court's analytical

framework for triggering a jury trial right in federal court typically
includes a significant originalist element. 98 Certainly the Court has
dealt with new circumstances creatively, and its analogical reasoning

may treat the old division between law and equity as quite loose
guidance. 99 Still, the originalist streak is there.
Less intuitive trajectories exist as well.

Consider Fourth

Amendment cases. Putting aside early and fairly uninformative
treatments, 00 originalism appears to have a U-shaped relationship to the
doctrine. A crucial opinion early in the Court's doctrinal development
93 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (judging excessive punishment by
"standards... that currently prevail"); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990)
(resolving textual ambiguity with a rendition of precedent).
94 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 722-25 & n.6 (2004) (relying on a "historic and
substantial state interest" in not funding devotional theology degrees).
95 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
96 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down Internet regulation); Cent.
Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (striking down advertising regulation).
97 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-43 (1995) (relying in
part on history and tradition of anonymous political advocacy); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 462 (1907) (citing Blackstone's Commentaries).
98 See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476, 487
(1935); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830) (asserting what must have been
"present to the minds of the framers of the amendment" when they preserved the right).
99 See, e.g., Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193 (permitting analogy to modem statutory claims from
common-law forms of action and their remedies); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10
(1970) (referring to "practical abilities and limitations of juries" as a third prong of the inquiry).
100 See Den ex dem Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
285-86 (1856) (holding the Warrant Clause inapplicable to a creditors' civil action); Livingston's
Lessee v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469, 478-79, 482, 539, 551-52 (1833) (denying the claimant's Bill of
Rights arguments as inapplicable to states, though without citing the Fourth Amendment).
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is Boyd v. United States,10 ' and it was laced with originalist history.
The Court indicated that its aim was to know "the minds of those who
framed the [F]ourth [A]mendment."' 10 2 By the 1960s, however, the
theme shifted. An exclusionary rule for the states was adopted with
10 3
reference to "reason and truth" rather than ratification history,
pragmatic interest balancing was injected into the doctrine often to
serve law enforcement interests, 10 4 and the Court was open to updating
Fourth Amendment concepts when applied to new technologies. 0 5 Yet
lately this kind of innovation seems stalled. In some recent opinions,
historical arguments have been featured. Although the majority did not
fully follow its suggestion, Wyoming v. Houghton10 6 indicates that
originalist history deserves lexical priority in judging the reasonableness
10 7
of searches.
Finally, consider substantive due process doctrine. Originalism
might bear an upside down U-shaped relationship to a strand of it.
Admittedly this picture of the doctrinal development requires
imagination. But the curve starts to appear by concentrating on three
case groupings. The first is Chief Justice Taney's nonhistorical
reference to slaveowner property rights in Dred Scott, 10 8 coupled with
the "fair" and "reasonable" test of Lochner v. New York. 10 9 Second is
10
the essential common-law privileges depicted in Meyer v. Nebraska,I
plus the references to "deeply rooted" national history in Bowers v.
Hardwick.I1I The third and final point on the curve is the evolutionary
understanding of liberty as a judicially enforceable concept in Lawrence
v. Texas. 1 2 It is not clear that any routine normative logic prescribes
this trend.
My objective is not comprehensiveness. Nor is it to elevate past
judicial practice into a test of sound decision-making. My aim is to
101 116U.S. 616(1886).
102 Id. at 626-27, 630.

103 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555-67 (1976) (upholding a
border patrol checkpoint); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (permitting stop and frisk).
105 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (relying on precedent as well as
"the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication").
106 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
107 See id. at 299-300, 303 (turning to balancing after the majority's review of judicial
precedent on originalist history suggested no violation); see also Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S.
318, 327-45 (2001) (presenting a history of arrest and judging it inconclusive).
108 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857) (Taney, C.J.).
109 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). In one sentence, Lochner asserts "the Fourteenth Amendment was
not designed to interfere" with reasonable conditions on property and liberty. Id. at 53.
110 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
111478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Bowers did rely on much
more. See id. at 190-95 (characterizing case law, recent history, and the judiciary's proper role).
112 539 U.S. 558, 564-72 (2003) (relying on case law and principle and complexifying
history). Even Lawrence waved at originalism, however. See id. at 579 (asserting that drafters
and ratifiers of the Due Process Clauses "knew times can blind us to certain truths").
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confirm a variety of approaches across time. It is extremely unlikely
that this variety can be eliminated by additional investigation, or
justified by one normative theory.
Instead, we can begin to account for the various trajectories by
pointing out multiple forces that operate to produce judicial opinions. If
nothing else, the mix of methods is likely to change with the Court's
personnel. Perhaps this is more probable today, when commitments to
precedent or originalism are considered qualifications for judicial
appointments. Along these lines, the demands of interest groups,
political elites, or the public in general might shift and influence Court
judgments and Court opinions. Decision-making methods might be
adjusted to become more plausible to salient audiences. And the
Court's power relative to other institutions will vary over time, which
could likewise influence its freedom to select its decision-making
methods.
There is no reason to expect that judicial decision-making trends
will match an abstract normative vision of progress. Too many forces
are at work. It might be that there is no rational "trajectory" here at all.
But there is still reason to formulate a vision. The history of
constitutional adjudication in the judiciary shows that much is possible,
given the right conditions.
III.

ORIGINALISM'S VERSIONS AND VULNERABILITIES

We are now in a better position to evaluate the appropriate
relationship between originalism and time. More specifically, should
originalism's strength decline when the distance from ratification is
long? My response comes in three steps. First, I briefly specify a
popular version of originalism. In academic circles, the general notion
of original public meaning is surging. Second, I summarize key
criticisms of originalism, and I stress the importance of time lags to
these critiques. I also question the critic's typical concession that
originalism is proper shortly after ratification.
Originalism is
sometimes weaker than that. Third, in the next Part, I push back in the
other direction. Justifications for originalism are organized and
evaluated according to their promise in besting time-oriented objections.
Justifications with longevity are thus prioritized.
A.

Originalism'sAlternatives

Rational decisions are a function of information and judgment
within a given setting. Actors in institutions have particular objectives
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and capacities, and they select data that seem relevant to serving those
goals within those competencies.' 1 3 One informational input is law.

Legal interpretation may then be thought of as a process by which
information is derived from sources recognized as law for the purpose
of decision-making. Scholarship regarding which activities count as
"interpretation" is divided,'

14

but, however one specifies the concept,

interpretation involves meaning, and it is done for various reasons.
My concern is interpretation of a legal text for the purpose of
decision-making, including in a court with authority to issue judgments.
Here the relevance of any interpretive method is not in its ability to
specify meaning in the abstract, but rather in its capacity to influence
actual decisions that affect social life. From this vantage, originalism is
worth studying insofar as it indicates normative prescriptions for
decision-making.
But "originalism" is a label covering several distinguishable
methods, and each version might be justified in different ways. Indeed,
5
the prevailing version and its justifications have adapted over time."1
In general, originalism turns contemporary actors toward sources of
information that were generated in the past so as to preserve, rather than
revisit, a previous decision. Those who engage in originalism are
supposed to understand the meaning of a previous decision and to
remain faithful to that decision without making their own judgment
about its propriety. It will not always be clear how best to preserve the

meaning of a decision in a new setting. And even after understanding
something about "preserving meaning" across time, the idea might be

operationalized through any number of protocols.
113 See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 4-5 (stressing intelligent institutional choice as
necessary for translating social goals into policy choices); Cass R. Sunstem & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003) (arguing that debates about legal
interpretation must account for institutional capacities and dynamic effects); see generally
Samaha, supra note 9, at 633-34, 675-77 (discussing law as information).
114 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 58-64
(1994) (emphasizing the interpreter's perspective in generating textual meaning); Stanley Fish,
Intention Is All There Is: A CriticalAnalysis ofAharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1112, 1114 (2008) (asserting that finding authorial intent "is"
interpretation, but that the concept lacks guidance for how to ascertain intent); Kent Greenawalt,
Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 268, 268-70 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (including
text, original meaning, underlying rationale or basic values, application to particular cases, and
stare decisis in a description of legal interpretation).
115 See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 603-13
(2004); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134-48 (2003). Other recent intellectual histories
include DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER
ORIGINALISM 20-154 (2005), and JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 101-216 (2005). A relatively unsympathetic review is
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalismas a PoliticalPractice:The Right's Living Constitution,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006).
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We can begin by considering originalism as a method of assigning
meaning to a legal text. Originalism need not be cabined in this way; it
might roam more freely into history. Still, self-described originalists
commonly present their approach as a (or the) way to understand
written law for the purpose of decision-making, and some advocates of
' 16
originalist methods may prefer to identify themselves as "textualists."'
The analysis below generally applies either way, but it will focus on
originalism as an option for providing information about the written
Constitution's meaning.
This leaves several choices. Considering the debates of selfdescribed originalists and their critics, additional dimensions emerge.
Contested elements of originalism's optimal design have included: (1)
the specific informational objective for the method, such as drafters'
intent or ratifiers' understanding or a more general public meaning; (2)
the sources and reasoning acceptable for reaching that objective, such as
nonpublic drafting history, dictionaries, legal treatises, and postratification practice; (3) the level of generality at which historical
lessons are drawn---or whether to prefer concepts over
conceptualizations, or general principles over expected applications; (4)
the degree of confidence with which historical judgments must be made
and the resources appropriately devoted to obtaining these answers; (5)
the relative strength of originalist inquiry in a decision process
compared to other factors; and (6) decision rules for situations in which
the method "runs out" and ends in uncertainty. 17 This information
must then be brought to bear on a contemporary dispute. A decisionmaker might understand a text's meaning for one era without having
confidence about its application to a particular dispute in a subsequent
116 See ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22-23, 37-38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
117 This rendition of choices was informed by RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89-113 (2004); ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 139-160 (1990); RONALD
DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 118-23 (2006); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 525-52 (2d ed. 2005); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-22 (1997); TRIBE,

supra note 38, at 47-70; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 34-37 (1999); Stephen M. Griffin, 2008
Rebooting Originalism 1185; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849 (1989); William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original
Meaning, and the Case of Amar's Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487 (2007); Mitchell N.
Berman, Originalism Is Bunk (Dec. 30, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1078933); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism,(U. Ill. Coll. Law
Pub. Law & Legal Research, Working Paper No. 07-24, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1 120244. For an argument that "originalism" has evolved and multiplied
in its versions, see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism (Geo. Wash. U. Law
Sch.
Legal
Studies
Research
Paper
No.
393,
2008),
available
at
http://ssm.com/abstract- 1090282.
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And because there are still shifting disagreements over the

optimal form, one cannot specify a universal and fixed version of
originalism.
To evaluate arguments within the intellectual mainstream, I will

focus on "original public meaning originalism." One formulation of its
informational goal is "the public or objective meaning that a reasonable
listener would place on the words used in the constitutional provision at

the time of its enactment."1 19 This goal can be related to ordinary
sentence meaning in accord with conventional usage at ratification,
rather than anyone's subjective intentions. However, more direction is
required to make the general inquiry useful to decision-makers. A
variety of sources and arguments might still be accepted as relevant
beyond, say, old dictionaries and legal treatises.1 20 It does seem clear,

however, that the level of generality for this inquiry is not
predetermined. Contemporary proponents of original public meaning in
constitutional interpretation indicate that such questions are themselves
historical, or involve normative commitments external to originalism
properly understood. 12 1 Whether a clause incorporates general concepts
or more particular conceptions would then depend on what a reasonable
observer would have concluded at the time of adoption.
The notion of original public meaning's strength is worth pausing
over. As emphasized above, we ought to investigate how originalism
118 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
STAN. L. REv. 395, 401-02, 442-43 (1995); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L.REV. 519, 588-90, 593-98 (2003) (exploring how new circumstances
might reveal indeterminacy in the text's original public meaning).
119 BARNETT, supra note 117, at 92. For other formulations in the same family, with differing
degrees of connection to a public understanding that actually existed at some point in time, see
Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 29 (2000);
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 115, at 1132, 1143-45 & n.113 (looking to a "hypothetical,
objective, reasonably well-informed reader"); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning,
88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002) (looking to "a fully informed public audience, knowing all that
there is to know about the Constitution and the surrounding world"); Scalia, supra note 116, at 17
(looking for "the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed
alongside the remainder of the corpusjuris");see also BORK, supra note 117, at 144 ("[W]hat the
ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting must be taken to be what the public of that time
would have understood the words to mean ..... The search is not for a subjective intention.");
Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1127, 1136 (1998) (looking for the understanding of "the ratifying public"); cf WHITTINGTON,
supra note 117, at 34-37, 194-96 (looking for evidence of ratifiers' intent); Solum, supra note
117, at 3-6 (looking for the conventional semantic meaning of clauses).
120 Compare, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 117, at 92-93 (demoting nonpublic drafting history),
with Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 115, at 1118-20 (contending such history can be evidence of
how "the hypothetical Ratifier" understood the text).
121 See BARNETT, supra note 117, at 119-20; BORK, supra note 117, at 149; see also
WHITTINGTON, supra note 117, at 186-87 (arguing from speaker intentions rather than correct
semantic meaning). A contrary view seems to be Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293-95 (2007) (relying on constitutional text plus highlevel principle and disregarding original expected applications, but not clearly or solely on
historical grounds).
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influences decisions of consequence, and that mission calls for a
comparison between the directions indicated by originalist inquiry and
any other effects on decision-making. Advocates have indicated that
original public meaning originalism is the proper method of interpreting
constitutional text and that it should strongly influence judicial
decisions in constitutional cases, perhaps to the exclusion of other
resources such as precedent. 22 Regardless whether one defines
"interpretation" and "meaning" differently from these proponents, the
central issue for us is how influential their prescription ought to be
within concrete decision situations.
It is true that some originalists emphasize the limits of their
interpretive method. They do not believe it can exhaust the text's
meaning. Vagueness or other uncertainty will persist, which might be
resolved through "constitutional construction" inside or outside the
judiciary. 123 The more vagueness one sees, the less pressure originalist
interpretation can exert on decision-making. It is even possible that
many of today's actual debates over constitutional meaning cannot be
resolved with originalist interpretation, strictly speaking. The meaning
of the written Constitution might be mostly supplied through
construction and, depending on the decision rules for that domain, the
document could be "living" within that abundant space. Freedom to
construct should not be oversold, however. Whenever determinate
meaning is yielded by originalist interpretation, a proponent might
believe that judges and others should abide by it always or at least in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances. In any event, attention is owed
to versions of originalism designed to significantly influence
decisions.1 24
122 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 117, at 5; Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedentwith Original
Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269 (2005) (stating precedent

should fall when inconsistent with a determinate original public meaning); Kesavan & Paulsen,
supra note 115, at 1142-45.
123 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 117, at 7 (stating that "constitutional construction is

essentially political"); Solum, supra note 117, at 68; see also Nelson, supra note 118, at 597-98
(observing that originalists can accept a role for nonjudicial actors in liquidating indeterminacy,
though that domain may not be well-defined); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically
CorruptingInfluence of Precedent,22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 296 n. 18 (2005) (contending that
indeterminacy after originalist interpretation should yield democratic discretion); cf BARNETT,
supra note 117, at 118-23 (characterizing constitutional construction as principled gap filling to
resolve cases after originalist interpretation runs out). Much of the analysis below regards the
prescription that courts ascertain and enforce original public meaning through "interpretation,"
without speaking to "construction." In a final section, I explore a use for history that would not
plainly qualify as "interpretation" as these scholars use the term. See infra Part IV.D.2
(discussing randomization).
124 For now, we might bracket the necessary degree of confidence and deserved resources. It
seems likely that originalism's proponents are willing to accept substantial decision costs to
achieve relatively high degrees of certainty about public meaning and its limits, but it could be
that only some decision-makers should engage in the most extensive historical inquiry. Trial
courts, for example, might not be well suited to the task.
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Skeptics will have already retrieved a mental list of common
objections to originalism, including doubts as to whether originalist
questions are constraining or even intelligible. A standard reaction is to
wonder whether it is meaningful to ask, "What would a reasonable
person who lived here in 1789 (or later) have thought about the validity
of x if x had occurred then instead of in 2008, or if he were alive in 2008
when x actually occurred?" These deep objections might be persuasive
in certain respects, but they can be deferred. For now, recall that many
critics of originalism can accept its use when the interpretation lag is
short, that a measure of originalism is a feature of public judicial
reasoning, and that a substantial audience is willing to at least consider
originalist methods. Given the persistence of originalism as an option,
skeptics and enthusiasts might pause to ask how, if at all, originalism's
influence should vary over time.
B.

Time-Oriented Criticism

Suppose that a judge must interpret words that were ratified in
accord with Article V and that are now considered supreme law. In one
possible universe, the word string W was ratified a century ago. In an
alternative universe, W was ratified last year. Should a judge approach
the interpretation and use of W-ld differently from W-new in rendering
her decision?
To move forward, there must be an account of this decisionmaker's goals. These accounts are contested even as a matter of
accurate description, and certainly there is no universally agreed-upon
rendering of good judicial behavior. The continuing debate over
interpretive method suggests this much. Instead, the analysis will begin
with a series of hopefully plausible elements of appropriate judicial
conduct, and then add a concession to simplicity. Much of the
discussion will apply on different assumptions, so the reader need not
suspend disagreement with these choices. But a general, initial picture
of judicial objectives will be constructive.
Assume, then, that our judge is public spirited and committed to
improving social well-being in a lawful way. She is acting with the best
intentions, she wants to follow her oath to faithfully perform her duties
under the Constitution, and she is of at least average competence.
Furthermore, this judge understands the practical limits of acting within
her institution, her personal abilities and the normative questions
surrounding any assumption of power. She is self-aware, practical and
125
honestly searching for the best interpretive method.
125 Cf James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the
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To simplify the analysis, however, it will help to bracket intrajudicial strategy for the time being.126 Assume that the judge need not
convince fellow judges that her understanding of W is correct, now or as
a matter of coordinating judicial decisions in the future. Nor does she
have reason to act strategically in light of other judges' preferences.
There is one Supreme Court, she is it, and she is not concerned with her
reputation in the lower courts.
1.

Objections Summarized

A heartfelt critic of originalism might advise that, whatever the
judge does, she should not look backward to historical sources
associated with the text. And she should avoid these resources whether
the target for interpretation is W-old or Wnew. True, recent history will
likely influence the judge's reading. She will not be able to ignore the
linguistic conventions of her time when she first scrutinizes the text.
But the true critic would maintain that no special effort should be made
toward re-creating a historical context, however recent, that does not
now exist. Other considerations would fill the gap, and the options are
numerous: contemporary moral judgment about the text's best meaning
for now, respect for existing practices in the absence of a strong
justification for disruption, deference to the judgment of other
constitutional decision makers, and so on. Doubts about such timeinsensitivity were raised above, but it is useful to rehearse the
arguments that might underwrite such firm opposition to the use of
originalism in decision-making.
One complaint is not exactly a criticism. It has been argued that
sound historical inquiry reveals that past generations did not accept
certain originalist techniques, and therefore a genuine originalist would
have to follow that lead. 127 This is a possible consequence of originalist
investigation, not a reason to avoid the investigation. Nor is there an
apparent reason within the logic of originalism to short-circuit this
effort by assuming that the results of these historical inquiries will be
always determinate or always identically liberating. This is especially
Study of Judicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7, 9 (1983) ("In a nutshell, judges' decisions are a
function of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but constrained
by what they perceive is feasible to do.").
126 On the issue of interpretive coordination across judges, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 121-24 & n.3

(2006) (applying the fallacy of division).
127 The classic argument is H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 889, 894-902 (1985) (finding a form of common-law reasoning
with regard to texts). A response is Nelson, supra note 118, at 523-39 (finding some anticipation
of invariant meaning and settlement by practice). Powell targeted original intent originalism, not
what later became known as original public meaning originalism.
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true in light of the Article V option for supreme lawmaking and the role
for states therein. 128 It seems to require more convincing proof than is

presently available to settle the questions whether, for example, the
original public meaning of the Commerce Clause or the Coin Money
Clause was as "evolutionary" or "static" as the Speech Clause or the
Equal Protection Clause. Insofar as the history is ambiguous, one might

decide to fill the gap with an assumption of interpretive flexibility over
time. But this assumption would not be based on the history; it would

move along a path leading us out of originalism and toward a range of
objections to its unrestrained use.
At least one methodological attack on originalism is constant

across time. Some believe that strong originalism is-often or always,
conceptually or practically-impossible to perform. Perhaps there just
is no answer to the questions suggested by original public meaning and
129
other forms of originalism. The classic exposition is Paul Brest's.

Part of his objection to originalism rested on the difficulty of attributing
any intent to multimember lawmaking bodies, 130 but his concerns ran

further and he equally questioned the usefulness of strong textualism as
applied to new circumstances. His description of textualism resembles
original public meaning originalism.13 1 Regardless, Brest's point about
indeterminacy can be applied to versions of originalism that disavow

subjective intent. There need not be widespread or even majority
agreement on a given question of public meaning, at any point in
time. 32 One might press this concern to the edge: Perhaps an accepted
public meaning for any law is a phantom, a mischaracterization of
irreducibly contested understandings for all legal texts. In the case of
original public meaning, the observers who are the target for the inquiry

are mental constructs.1 33 At most, according to this attack, there are
rhetorical or political reasons for acting as if originalism's questions
128 See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(remarking on Article V as the preferred mode for introducing "useful alterations ... suggested
by experience"); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (pointing out state
influence in the amendment process). This returns to the issue of how, if at all, to distinguish
"amendment" from "interpretation." See Levinson, supra note 27, at 25-36; see also RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 67 (1986) (distinguishing "fit" from "the invention of something
new").
129 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV.
204 (1980).
130 See id. at 213-17.
131 See id. at 205-09 (discussing a text's plain meaning to an ordinary English speaker, and
suggesting difficulty in understanding the linguistic and social context of dated legal texts).
132 See Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of
Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 529, 534-35 (2008) (arguing on this basis that originalism,
including original public meaning originalism, is "quite often" impossible).
133 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 119, at 398 (using an objective, intelligent, and fullyinformed public audience as the touchstone for originalism); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 115,
at 1143-45 & n. 113 (largely following Lawson).
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have answers.134 This objection applies with equal force to W,d and W_
new"

But for most, the radically skeptical position claims too much
territory. History might even be indispensable to interpretation under
certain conditions. Ancient text can lose all conventional meaning with
time, at which point it becomes difficult to see how interpretation takes
place absent historical investigation. May anything sensible be done
with the reference to "Letters of Marque and Reprisal" in Article I,
Section 8, without history? 135 There also are concerns with maximum
skepticism for recently enacted text. Here the concept of public
meaning could at least preclude certain understandings. Disagreement
over meaning does not foreclose operative conventions about the
boundary of meaning, even if that boundary is arbitrary in a moral
sense. 136 To accept radical skepticism about originalist investigation, it
seems, one must also believe it impossible to understand the words of
others when delivered face-to-face in the here-and-now. This has a selfrefuting quality.
With a belief that originalism is sometimes guiding, objections to it
become heavily dependent on time. Consider a milder infeasibility
argument: that substantial time lags make recovery of old concepts both
difficult and a creative enterprise. 137 This could be acutely true for
generalist judges, whose competence with historical sources may be in
doubt. 38 Even if these dated meanings could be accurately excavated,
there is the question how an understanding of a different historical
episode should be applied to the situation in to.' 39 Given temporal
distance, the answers might be more challenging to provide with
134 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2366-67 (2002)
(suggesting that originalism survives for "symbolic and strategic" reasons, not because it
constrains).
135 Apparently the last such letter issued in or near 1812. See FRITZ GROB, THE RELATIVITY
OF WAR AND PEACE: A STUDY IN LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 237-39 (1949) (calling the
Clause "perfectly obsolete"). Grob distinguishes between letters of marque (commissions for
privateers) and letters of marque and reprisal (at one time referring to authorized self-help for
individual injury suffered abroad, but later referring to armed trading vessels). He reports that the
United States commissioned privateers, but never armed trading vessels. See id. at 239.
136 See Jack M. Balkin, Deconstruction's Legal Career, 27 CARDOzO L. REV. 719, 734
(2005); see also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943,
951 (1995) (discussing semiotic content that is socially attached to action in a given context).
137 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS INROBES 68-71 (2005) (critiquing the coherence, based
on time lags, of a "fundamentalist" originalism); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 802 (1983)
(suggesting that we can understand another era "[w]ith a great deal of imaginative effort" but that
"the understanding we achieve is not the unique, correct image of the framers' world").
138 See William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L.
REv. 1237, 1250-51 (1986).
139 See Lessig, supra note 118, at 401-02, 442-43 (discussing meaning translation for the
purpose of preservation).
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confidence, at a reasonable level of effort, and without lapsing into
indeterminacy. This is a worry about originalism mostly limited to W_
old.

If
Impracticality does not exhaust time-oriented objections.
originalism turns out to be accurate, cheap and determinate, a package
of normative arguments nonetheless might recommend alternatives.
First, a judge opposing the outcomes of ordinary politics with original
Depending on the
meaning could be intolerably undemocratic.
operative theory of democracy, a just decision-maker easily could
privilege the will of the living (however defined) over the will of the
dead (however defined). 140 The positive law of past generations is not
necessarily representative of our characteristics and judgment,
particularly insofar as their government was designed to include many
fewer voices through suffrage. The settlements they reached reflected a
different populace and a different politics. This presentism need not
conflict with a commitment to treating the document as valid law,
either. An intermediate position is that each generation should have
liberty to establish textual meaning according to contemporary
understandings or needs. 141 And each generation unavoidably chooses
142
whether to respect this text as law; it has no practical force otherwise.
143
Second, critics test originalism for results on other fronts.
Originalism might deliver undesirable consequences, depending on
one's value set, and these adverse effects should grow more likely and
more severe over time. Originalism has been promoted as a stabilizing
force, and surely it is for a subset of cases. But in other instances, the
method is a tool for disrupting the status quo. At least on occasion,
strong originalism threatens new moral values and judgments, existing
practices and political bargains, common decision methods and
However inevitable or desirable
precedent within the courts.
originalism might be for W-new, the argument concludes, it is overly
difficult or unwise for Wold.
Little effort is required to locate a reliance on time lags in nearly
all of these objections. Whether the argument is impracticality,
disruption, democratic threats or other undesirable consequences, the
objections tend to be fueled by the passage of time. This has two

140 See THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 12 (E.P. Dutton & Co., 1951) (1791) ("[A]s

Government is for the living, and not for the dead, it is the living only that has any right in it.").
141 See William J. Brennan, Jr., Education and the Bill of Rights, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 219, 224

(1964).
142 See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1053 (1990)
(observing that law and culture fade without current effort).
143 See

STEPHEN

BREYER,

ACTIVE

LIBERTY:

INTERPRETING

OUR

DEMOCRATIC

CONSTITUTION 118 (2005) (arguing that "literalists" themselves ultimately rely on
consequences); Cass R. Sunstein, Of Snakes and Butterflies: A Reply, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2234,
2239 (2006) (arguing that originalism must be justified by its consequences).
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implications. The first involves the proper emphasis of originalist
argument. Those sympathetic to originalism should prize normative
justifications that can overcome the reality of time lags in supreme law.
This relates to a second implication. Originalism's critics might
concede that strong originalism is appropriate shortly after
ratification. 144 This concession is limited; because the Article V
amendment rate has been low, today's interpretation lags are typically
long, and the courts lag behind others in their efforts to understand the
document. It is, nevertheless, a meaningful thought that follows from a
timing orientation.
2.

Originalism in Ratification's Wake

But in fact the objections to originalist decision-making can be
advanced further, to reach W-new in some circumstances.
First, there is little reason to believe that originalism is inevitable
here. Other approaches to reading text are available in all time periods.
The argument is perhaps cleanest for judicial interpretation. While
judges are hardly detached from the mores of the political community in
which they operate, neither are they a representative sample of that
community. There is no guarantee that a judge's view of the best moral
reading of W-new, for example, will be screened out from the interpretive
process. Nor will any such influence necessarily track a text's public
meaning as defined by the hypothetical objective observer. Perhaps
judges ought to vigilantly guard against the impact of their ideological
commitments when adjudicating constitutional disputes; and perhaps
145
originalism is especially easy to perform close in time to ratification.
But this would demonstrate only that original public meaning is less
costly to execute at the point of ratification. It would not eliminate
alternatives.
Our review of cases ending short adjudication lags is a reminder of
originalism's contingency. Perhaps none can be confirmed as wholly
originalist, while some have significant non- or anti-originalist themes.
Recall the slave sale case of Osborn v. Nicholson, which applied a
natural law-inspired clear statement rule to a recent constitutional
amendment.1 46 No resistance from forces responsible for the Thirteenth
Amendment seems to have disrupted the Court's preferences in this

144 See supra note 10 (collecting sources).
145 After all, a judge's understanding of new text is something like a data point on which
public meaning can be established. Cf Brest, supra note 10, at 208 (indicating that, near the time
of adoption, an interpreter "unconsciously places the provision in its linguistic and social
contexts").
146 See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
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situation. Of course there is an arguably special attribute to Osborn:
The case rested closer to the margins of the nation's struggle over
slavery than to its center. The Court was helping distribute losses
across commercial participants in the slave market and perhaps
influencing incentives to plan for the possibility of legal transitions.
One probably should expect that judicial departure from any result
suggested by originalism close to ratification is most likely to occur
when the issue is of secondary importance to the text's enthusiasts. In
other situations, judges will more often feel practically or morally
constrained.
If judicial departures from originalism for W-new are possible,
perhaps they are defensible. This depends on the applicable normative
framework for the institution in action, but perhaps there are persuasive
visions for constitutional decision-makers that allow for anti-originalist
outcomes in ratification's wake.
Consider the possibility that the Supreme Court is the best place to
vet moral principle over some sort of less-enlightened policy struggle, 147
and that a formal amendment may come about because of the latter. On
this view, the Court can be a valuable counterweight to Article V
politics, which cannot be counted on to safeguard these favored
principles or engage in this form of reasoning in every instance. Again,
the objective public meaning of an amendment need not coincide with a
judge's morally best rendering of that text, and some might prefer the
latter regardless of the timeframe.
A less philosophical twist on this position involves political pacts.
Constitutions and institutions may be seen as arrangements of
convenience in which elements of a political community are allocated
various roles of influence in order to make social progress or avoid
social disaster. 148 On this view and to the extent judges have the ability
to influence policy outcomes, the Court might represent either elite
values or a countercyclical political force. 149 Either way, nonoriginalist
interpretation of new amendments could further these pact-oriented
models for judicial behavior.
Our hypothetical judge is not obviously well-suited or sympathetic
to these models. Readers might feel likewise. The models might be too
147 Cf RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 34-35 (1996) (recognizing that the institutional
questions reduce to practical considerations and results); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of
Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 518 (1981) (defending a principle-oriented role for the Court,
for at least some issues).
148 See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY

12-18, 87-98, 139-40 (1999) (characterizing successful constitutions as self-enforcing
conventions); Barry R. Weingast, The ConstitutionalDilemma of Economic Liberty, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 89, 90-99 (2005) (considering constitutions as compacts among competing powers).
149 Cf Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understandingthe Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REv. 1045, 1067 (2001) (describing federal judges as "temporally extended
representatives of particular parties").
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controversial, too optimistic, too cynical or too often inoperable. Yet
discarding them leaves another concern with unswerving originalism for
W-new: the problem of disruption.
Unlike the models for judicial behavior just discussed, the
disruption concern may arise in lockstep with post-ratification societal
developments and without any independent judicial resistance to any
change indicated by a constitutional amendment. It helps to remember
that adjudication lags of some length are largely unavoidable. Courts
will rarely be the very first institution to take a position on contested
textual meaning in a system lacking pre-enactment advisory opinions.
Others will be grappling with the ramifications of new text before the
judiciary offers an official opinion on the matter.
Thus even an extremely short gap between ratification and judicial
interpretation opens the possibility for shifts in nonjudicial
arrangements and hardening forces that will interfere with any judicial
preference for originalist outcomes. To be sure, short time lags make
this situation less likely; not every amendment portends swift and major
change at odds with plausible renderings of original public meaning.
Yet time is only a proxy for serious change. An inflexible rule
imposing strong judicial originalism close to ratification seems risky
and unlikely. The early partisanship of presidential electors is worth
referencing here. Even a courageous Court might have treated the
argument for elector independence in Ray v. Blair in the same way, and
deferred to contemporary practice, had the issue been litigated in 1796
instead of 1952.150
To the extent judges cannot resist powerful
sociopolitical change, shifting away from strong originalism can be an
institutional given.
In addition, there is the issue of indeterminacy in the wake of
ratification. Comprehensive and sophisticated originalist inquiries will
not recover decisive information in all litigated disputes touching on
new constitutional text. Decades do not have to pass before unplanned
developments or unconsidered applications of new clauses are driven
into the court system. Osborn is again a useful illustration. Recall that
the slave buyer argued that the Thirteenth Amendment should immunize
him from a lawsuit for nonpayment. 151 If they had considered the
matter at the point of ratification in 1865, trained professionals might
have accurately predicted how the Court would react to such an
argument, and they might have believed that such a foreseeable reaction
was effectively part of the Amendment's meaning in the first place. But
greater imagination is needed to believe that any other objective
150 See supra text accompanying notes 56-57, 82-83.
151 See Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. 654, 663-64 (1872) (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing
that slave contracts "were and are against sound morals and natural justice" and that their positive
law basis was eliminated by the Thirteenth Amendment).
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observer would have reached the same conclusions at the time of
ratification. Perhaps no understanding on the issue existed in 1865. In
any event, there will be occasions on which new constitutional text
generates questions that were not confronted or not resolved during the
ratification process and that an objective observer could not confidently
52
answer.
Finally, strategic opportunities surrounding the compromise
trajectory are worth mentioning. If litigants know that judges will turn
to strong originalism soon after ratification but not thereafter, then
litigants might adjust the timing of their suits accordingly. Those whose
positions are strengthened by originalist sources will prefer to litigate
early, while others will prefer delay. This possibility is moderated to
the extent that parties cannot control timing; we might view the federal
judiciary's standing doctrine and opposition to advisory opinions as
convenient limits on claimant freedom over timing. 153 Nor does a
defendant in a justiciable suit have a right to delay litigation for a
generation. These constraints on parties do not eliminate judicial power
over timing, however. Judges have used several devices to control
timing, and surely sometimes to increase the odds of their preferred
outcome. 154 But even if the compromise trajectory is predictable and
the relevant players have good reason to prefer one time over another,
the opportunity for gaming is bounded by our low formal amendment
rate. Most of the document is long past the age when skeptics would
concede the propriety of strong originalism.
Still, some critics probably have been too bashful. Originalism is
not predestined for new constitutional text, and the issues of
determinacy, disruption, and optimal judicial influence indicate that
originalism should not always begin strong. This is not to assert that
originalism is never an appropriate consideration in decision-making. It
could be the presumptive methodology for an initial period, or even be
revived at later stages. But there is no time at which strong judicial
155
originalism is a priori inevitable or desirable.
152 In Part IV.D.2, infra, I will suggest that a less sophisticated originalism can elide part of
this indeterminacy problem, albeit at the expense of some typical originalist values.
153 See generally TRIBE, supra note 38, at 311-33 (reviewing justiciability norms).
154 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
155 Richard Primus's recent article, which suggests a downward-sloping trajectory for
originalism, makes that recommendation in part because the article's scope is different from the
investigation here. Primus aims to show a limited set of situations in which originalism is useful
under two affirmative justifications for the method. See Primus, supra note 10, at 24 (calling
these justifications "the best"). As for the relevance of time lags, he focuses on democratic
authority, see id. 2-5 & n.7, 46, and he agrees with a group of scholars who reach the same
conclusion on more limited analysis, see supra note 10 (collecting sources). Primus's discussion
of rule-of-law values does observe that originalism can be destabilizing when practice departs
from originalist meaning, see Primus, supra note 10, at 51, but time is not his theme, see id. at 57 (addressing justifications from judicial constraint without stressing time).
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STRONG ORIG[NALISM'S UNEASY DEFENSE

The above analysis builds a presumptive case against strong
originalism in judicial decision-making involving supreme law.
Standing alone, the foregoing suggests that judicial originalism not only
should expire but is occasionally stillborn. Our final task is to marshal
counterarguments.
Some of them are standard points from the
originalism debate, and many of them are indeed diminished with time
or hindered by other weaknesses. This indicates the usefulness of
exploring more innovative arguments, which I will attempt in the
closing pages. But before moving to affirmative arguments for
originalist decision-making, there is a question of historiography to be
addressed.
A.

History Over Time

Incompetence is a persistent charge in debates over interpretive
method. Some question our capacity to render a sound account of the
relatively distant past, a doubt that can be aimed at originalists and
historians more generally.
Perhaps the longer the temporal gap between an event and its
investigation, the less reliable an investigator's perceptions are likely to
be. This decline in quality might not be perfectly linear. But one might
believe that a professional history of 1868 is more likely to be excellent
if written in 1888 or 1908 instead of 2008, to the extent all other factors
can be held constant. This decline might, with time, cripple the case for
originalism. Insofar as originalism relies on excellence in historical
inquiry to form a basis for evaluating current practices, and insofar as
this excellence moves beyond anyone's reach, let alone a judge's reach,
there is reason to weaken originalism as a force in decision-making.1 56
Ought implies can, as they say.
There surely are trends that make sound professional history less
likely over time. Personal recollection of events softens and then
disappears as observers age and die off. They may record their
impressions, of course, but these recordings cannot be interrogated as
human beings. In effect, the authors of past impressions will have
156 Compare Lawson, supra note 119, at 398 (hypothesizing "a fully informed public
audience, knowing all that there is to know about the Constitution and the surrounding world" to
help operationalize originalism), with Nelson, supra note 138, at 1250-51 ("[Jludges are not
selected for office because they have special skill in reconstructing the intentions of individuals in
the past .... "). This concern is moderated by the possibility that judicial appointment standards,
applicant pools and sitting judges are responsive to the interpretive demands of the office.
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restricted the scope of our questions. No one today may canvass
citizens about their understanding of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in 1868, any more than Julius Caesar can be asked what he said
before crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C. In one English translation of
Plutarch, Caesar seems to have either announced his acceptance of risk
by declaring, "Let the die be cast," or indicated fatalism by the time he
reached the river, announcing, "The die is cast."' 57 Or Caesar might
have seen divine guidance in the form of an omen, and then uttered,
"The die is now cast."' 158 Or he might have deliberated rationally for a
time, until finally he "closed the eyes of reason and put a veil between
them and his peril," calling out, "Let the die be cast."' 59 Or he might
have uttered nothing at all. There is uncertainty about what he said,
what he meant, and what a later observer should understand the
surviving sources to prove. Similar difficulties may attend originalist
inquiry into legal meaning. This seems true whether the goal is to
recover actual patterns of language usage or to render the views of a
hypothetical informed reader of legal texts.
Nor will every pertinent record survive forever. Documentary
evidence can be destroyed, and it will degrade on its own. 160 These
eventualities are a motivation for statutes of limitations in litigation, and
there is a parallel basis for becoming less confident in anyone's ability
to generate accurate insights from surviving historical sources. Going
forward, this concern might be allayed. Digital formats could allow a
greater proportion of evidence to reach the future, and search engines
should enhance the future's ability to locate what it deems relevant. But
optimism about the quality of 2148's history of 2008 will not improve
2008's history of 1868.
A problem at least equally deep is recovering systems of meaning.
Understanding the context and manner of communication within a
centuries-old era is a major challenge.' 6 1 No history will be fully
reliable without making this effort and without possessing the skill to
research and contextualize the events of what is in essence a foreign
157 4 PLUTARCH'S LIVES 126, 291 (John Dryden & Arthur H. Clough trans., 1859). But cf 5
PLUTARCH'S LIVES 272 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., 1914) [hereinafter PERRIN'S PLUTARCH]; 7

PLUTARCH'S LIVES 522 (showing Plutarch using the same Greek words in two different Lives).
158 C. SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS, THE LIVES OF THE TWELVE CAESARS 22 (Alexander

Thomson & T. Forester trans., 1896).
159 PERRIN'S PLUTARCH, supra note 157, at 273.

160 See, e.g., Nancy E.Gwinn, The Fragility of Paper:Can Our HistoricalRecord Be Saved?,
PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1991, at 33, 35-47 (discussing "the brittle book problem" and the cost
of various preservation options); James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The
Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986) (evaluating negatively the
quality of surviving sources regarding drafting and ratification).
161 Accord Brest, supra note 10, at 208 (asserting that a textualist or originalist "must immerse
herself in their society"); see generally RAKOVE, supra note 117, at 20-21 (emphasizing
connections between founding era constitutional decisions and broader intellectual currents).
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nation. In this regard, critics of originalism and critics of judicial
reliance on foreign law have something in common.
That said, a different set of factors suggests another conclusion.
This is so even disregarding the virtues of second thought; surely distant
reflection on past events sometimes produces a more accurate account,
when the participants are no longer the interpreters. Nor must the
possibility of improving historical knowledge solely depend on
technological innovation. New technologies are indeed allowing
today's historians to preserve surviving records more effectively than
before, to digitize and search those records with more power, and to
extract information from artifacts in ways that could not have been
imagined a few decades ago. 162 All of this is true, but the hope for
improved historical knowledge can be stiffened with other logic.
Allied with technological innovation is progress in historiography.
"Progress" is meant in a realistic sense. It refers to the process of
developing, vetting, discarding, resuscitating and renovating
professional methodologies for historical inquiry. 163 The shifting
perspective on Reconstruction among historians and the multiplication
of angles on those events, for instance, is a development that many
scholars would view as a stride forward. 164 A few history department
enthusiasts might go further and hold that this process generates everbetter approaches with time. This optimism is, however, unnecessary to
the argument.
It might be that historical methods are merely
proliferating without improving on average. But even if historians only
expand the methodological options without creating undue distraction,
then we have a kind of progress. Better or greater options will assist the
intelligent investigator who wants information from the past, assuming
that the options are not simply distractions. And a companion for this
methodological progress is the growing stock of prior attempts to
understand the events in question. Prior studies are the beginnings of
162 See, e.g., Ray A. Williamson & Jannell Warren-Findley, Technology Transfer, Historic
Preservation, andPublic Policy, PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1991, at 14, 17 (noting that digitizing
the L'Enfant Map of Washington, D.C., may show Thomas Jefferson's influence by revealing his
pencil marginalia); Ann Longmore-Etheridge, The Healthy Constitution of Document Security,
SECURITY MGMT., Oct. 2003, at 26, 26 (describing high-tech encasements for the Constitution as
a parchment).
163 See generally ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., BEYOND THE GREAT STORY: HISTORY AS TEXT

AND DISCOURSE xi (1995) (suggesting value in an eclectic mix of approaches, both modem and
postmodem); GEORG G. IGGERS, HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: FROM
SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY TO THE POSTMODERN CHALLENGE 1-19 (1997) (identifying major

shifts in historiography since an institutional professionalization of history in the 1800s, and
challenges to a correspondence theory of truth, intentionality and temporal sequence); Pushpa
Bhave, History: Old and New, in HISTORIOGRAPHY: PAST AND PRESENT 12, 12 (Kirit K. Shah &
Meherjyoti Sangle eds., 2005) (relating history to social construction).
164 A brief recounting of the trends is presented in ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-77, at xix-xxv (Francis Parkman Prize ed., 2005),
which was an important effort to synthesize modem learning on the Era.
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new studies. 165
Finally, there is the contested issue of what counts as "good"
history. Self-styled originalists are probably unsympathetic to much
relativism in historical inquiry; a goal originalists tend to share is
constraining the set of results that a judge can produce. 166 But if we put
aside the goals that originalists might have and consider instead the
usefulness of originalism as a method of acquiring information, then
relativity, subjectivity and even postmodernism are oddly useful in
responding to worries that sound historical inquiry is slipping away. A
message from the postmodern perspective on professional history is that
the interpreter matters as much or more than the target of
interpretation. 167 This is a supposedly inescapable condition of human
observation. It is time-invariant, holding equally true for the historian
in 1908 and the historian in 2008. If historians are in this sense
unavoidably presentist, there is no reason to prefer the old vision of
1868 to the new vision. If anything, the postmodern perspective would
seem to default to the living's vision of events and not any past visionwhich would be dependent on the living for its survival and meaning,
anyway. From this perspective, the Constitution is forever young. It is
a word string existing for use in present-moment decisions and its age
is, in a sense, zero.
This might be pressing too hard. But one can see the lesson
without approaching the extremities of postmodern thought. Historical
inquiry is performed in different ways, for different purposes, and
according to different standards of excellence across time. There is
little reason to believe that our capacity to deliver what counts as good
history diminishes systematically as time passes, and some reason to
believe the opposite. Thinking that renderings of past events are always
permeated with subjectivity does nothing to alter this conclusion. To
the contrary, it seems to reinforce it. An originalist who requires
objective historical investigation has more reason to worry, of course.
Relativity is an enemy to that hope. And originalists require a method
for applying the lessons they learn from the historical sources they
select to the present-day controversies. An excellent understanding of
meaning in the past will not close all real cases. Even so, the concern
that time is at war with sound history seems weak enough for some
form of originalism to survive.

165 These observations might fit best for the single investigator. If many observers must agree
on how to characterize past events, multiplying the methodological options can increase decision
costs without guaranteeing offsetting benefits in improved accuracy.
166 See infra Part IV.C.
167 See IGGERS, supra note 163, at 9-10 (quoting HAYDEN WHITE, The Historical Text as
LiteraryArtifact, in THE TROPICS OF DISCOURSE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM 82 (1982)).
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ExpiringJustifications

Our attention can now shift to affirmative justifications for strong
originalism. These justifications will be explored in a way that
highlights their ability or inability to withstand time lags. This
organization might be awkward. Originalists often emphasize the need
to control judicial inquiry, but the discussion does not begin with these
arguments. There is an upside, however. The central challenge for
originalism is to find a form and reason that are convincing across time.
The discussion below attends to this priority.
Two justifications for originalism do seem to expire over time.
Although less prevalent in academic circles today, social contractarian
arguments for originalism have been made.1 68
The gist is that
originalism of some kind is the best or only way to preserve a previous
agreement that deserves respect. One might suppose that ratification
under Article VII and subsequent Article V amendments represent
bargains, or pacts, or contracts, or some other type of agreement to
which the people of this country assented, and that the substance of
these agreements is best characterized with originalist methods.
Dedication to such agreements might be grounded in various normative
theories, including the sense that enforcing them respects individual
autonomy, even if this means that some third party will force people in
the present to to abide by old judgments from t_ . We know that such
precommitment can be beneficial when the evaluation includes all time
periods instead of only the present moment, and that unconstrained
freedom to choose at every time period can be dangerous. This is the
story for many drug addicts and spendthrifts, anyway. 169
But precommitment analogies are inapt. One hitch is vagueness.
Sometimes historical inquiry will not illuminate the answer to novel
questions years later; sometimes the agreement is no deeper than the
document.1 70 But the problems run further. The U.S. population is
100% different today than it was in 1789 when the first version of the
document was ratified.
No one alive in 2008 witnessed any
constitutional text-making earlier than the ratification of the Sixteenth
168 Cf Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 190, 191-92 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (arguing that "the guide in expounding"
the Constitution ought to be "the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the
nation"). Madison later suggested that subsequent practice of the legislature is crucial to
understanding meaning. See Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831),
in 4 LETrERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 184-86 (1865).
169 See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 1-87 (2000) (identifying reasons for and methods of
precommitment for individuals); id. at 88-174 (applying and critiquing the precommitment model

for constitutions).
170 Cf

JEREMY

WALDRON,

LAW

AND DISAGREEMENT

266-75

reasonable disagreement and the downside of privileging past judgments).
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From the individual's
and Seventeenth Amendments in 1913.
perspective, there is no same "self' who can be bound by legal
arrangements that he or she "chose" in tLI. 171 True, today's population
might decide, explicitly or implicitly, that adhering to the document is
best. Public respect for the text is indeed part of our legal culture. But
that decision is not satisfying a precommitment, nor would it dictate
originalist interpretation of the document. The decision to treat the
document as law and the decision to interpret it by some method both
require argument that a precommitment model cannot provide. 7 2 No
matter how convincing the model, it becomes vulnerable to additional
173
challenges with the passage of time.
Similar reactions apply to a second justification. Many have
favorable impressions of those responsible for the document, especially
in its first edition. Perhaps the founders were uniquely intelligent,
knowledgeable and public spirited, 174 and hence their judgments should
be trusted. In philosophical terms, they might qualify as practical
authorities:1 75 that the founders made a judgment is itself a reason for
acting in accord with that judgment. Although the point is debatable,
faith in those who made the text might warrant a search for additional
information regarding those judgments. At a minimum, one could
believe that the best way to respect their superior judgment is to follow
the textual meaning on which those actors operated. If drafters and
ratifiers are something like practical authorities, then the argument for
our deference to them can be restated with the Condorcet Jury Theorem
(CJT). It demonstrates that the majority judgment of large groups can
171 See Jon Elster, Don't Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and
Complexities ofPrecommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1757-61 (2003).
172 An alternative is to move away from the living individual as the proper unit of moral
concern, and instead treat all generations who have lived in this country as a roughly singular
People.

See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-

GOVERNMENT 145-54 (2001) (defining "a people" as persons who exist or existed "under the
rule of a particular political-legal order"). Aside from the issue of how to define the class and
weight the preferences of each generation, the single-People perspective is contested at a more
basic level. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 212-13
(1993); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 381-91 (1997) (rejecting an
obligation to follow founding era preferences). Regardless, the choice is presentist. Today's
decision-makers are urged to adopt the single-People perspective based on argument.
173 Another version of consent need not weaken in this way. As mobility costs drop, it
becomes easier to think of residence as effective consent to the laws of the jurisdiction. But this
sorting dynamic is probably not robust enough to justify treating all U.S. residents as having
consented to the existing constitutional order. See Samaha, supra note 9, at 660. In addition, it is
difficult to see how strong originalism would follow from such consent. Presumably consent
would be to the constitutional system as it exists and not to a method of interpretation not already
or predictable in practice.
174 See, e.g., CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA x-xii (1966); Robert
C. Byrd, The Constitutionin Peril, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 385, 387, 395 (1998).
175 See Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at 382, 38285.
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be extraordinarily accurate-so long as the decision-makers have an
average accuracy rate better than random, offer their independent
judgments and answer the same question. 176 CJT might bolster the
credentials of past ratification decisions, without relying on the
questionable moral force of cross-generational consent.
But here the time lag problem is altered, not eliminated. First, we
should wonder whether past generations of constitution-makers
answered the questions we are asking. Even if they meant to
incorporate our interests and situation into their overall judgment,
presumably they were making judgments for all generations together.
Our position is different. Our judgments are for the present and the
future. Second, we must doubt their average accuracy. Assuming that
the relevant questions have right and wrong answers, CJT only holds if
decision-makers from as long as two centuries ago were on average
more accurate than not about the appropriate character of constitutional
law in 2008. This is possible, and it could be that many constitutional
decisions are unimportant anyway. But we can be sure that the founders
were imperfect. 177 And, at the least, arguments from practical authority
and CJT become more vulnerable with time. As facts, values,
experience and judgments change, there is often less reason to defer to
the decisions of past generations and more reason to depend on
judgments in t0-which might themselves be designed to satisfy CJT
178
conditions.
As with consent-based justifications, there is room for
disagreement. The growing ignorance of the founders and subsequent
constitution-makers might be preferable to the risks of myopia,
selfishness and strategic decision-making in 2008.
But the
understandable disagreement over whom to trust is related to the
passage of time. Time complicates the choice. So we still lack a
plausible justification for originalist decision-making that is insensitive
to the text's age.

176 See WALDRON, supra note 170, at 134-35 & n.43 (providing a numerical example);
Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen & Scott L. Feld, Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth,
15 THEORY & DECISION 261, 273-74 (1983) (discussing opinion-leader problems).

177 For example, it seems that they foresaw neither the need for an air force, see U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cls. 12-16; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (mentioning an army, a navy and militias), nor the
development of national political parties, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE
FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 5-

6 (2005).
178 See generally Samaha, supra note 9, at 653-55; Adrian Vermeule, Common Law
Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1503-06 (2007)
(suggesting that the Constitution's ratifiers compare favorably to contemporary judges but
without vouching for the reliability of either).
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Persistingand ProblematicJustifications

Other justifications for originalist inquiry are resilient to time.
They stand or fall regardless. The three explored here, however, have
other debilitating problems.
First, consider the argument that originalism is handy for
constraining discretion when courts are playing the high-stakes game of
supreme judicial review. 179 This value need not diminish over time. To
the extent people today worry about judicial discretion, an honest
commitment to originalism might guide judges away from their
ideological preferences, and it might offer everyone else a roughly
objective standard by which to evaluate the quality of judicial work.
Others are comfortable with judicial policymaking, considering the
imperfections of alternative institutions, or are not persuaded by
assertions of constraint and objectivity. As well, it is conceivable that
historical events become more opaque and less guiding with time. But
suppose that judicial policymaking is bad and that the assertions about
originalism's constraining force are true.
The central problem is that originalism is not plainly superior on
the policy dimension of constraint. There is, after all, the possibility of
courts deferring almost utterly to other institutions whenever
constitutional claims are raised. 8 0 That constraint is at least as strong
and objective. Other interpretive methods might perform similarly. It is
unclear why honest attention to reams of judicial precedent is less
constraining and less verifiable than honest attention to historical
understandings. 181 Both call for versions of analogical reasoning.
Furthermore, judges already act under a range of influences capable of
dampening independent judicial preferences. Even if we could set aside
the judicial selection process, which helps fashion the ideological
composition of the bench, as well as overt and credible threats from
other institutions, there is not much evidence from which to predict that
179 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 117, at 7, 143-53 (demanding neutral principles for the
exercise ofjudicial review and arguing that original public meaning delivers them).
180 The "almost" refers to what has been called judicial inquiry into "existence conditions."

See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial
Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1114-15 (2003). It seems that judges must ask what counts as
ordinary law to do their job as expected, and this seems to call for constitutional judgments that
cannot be reallocated elsewhere without making a constitutional judgment. See also Louis
Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
441, 444-65 (2004) (advancing ways in which the doctrine cannot avoid constitutional law
questions, or perhaps even political questions).
181 See David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
925-27 (1996); see also ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 156 n.31
(Hart Pub. 2005) (1992) (noting that judges could objectively constrain themselves by flipping
coins).
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judges will maintain sustained opposition to firm national policy
preferences. 82 It is unclear that any recommendation on interpretation
and decision-making method will bind down judicial behavior much
more effectively than politics and culture already do. Additional
arguments are required to select out originalism from alternative
strategies for constraint.
A second time-insensitive justification is, simply, originalism's
results. This does not turn on "our" consent by past ratification, or
founder brilliance, or a uniquely constraining force in decision-making.
Nor does it matter whether the date is 1808 or 2008. Honestly
performed originalism will generate a pattern of results in concrete
cases or, more modestly, will foreclose a set of results. The pattern
might be normatively alluring. Surely some originalists have been
attracted to historical inquiry in constitutional adjudication because
abortion rights appeared implausible on that method, while gun rights
and public religious displays did not.
Similarly for some
nonoriginalists, with the normative intuitions and methodological
outcome reversed. With fundamental moral commitments satisfied, one
can bite the bullet and accept displeasing results on secondary matters.
In any event, it does seem irresponsible to select interpretive methods
without concern for the foreseeable results. Sufficiently catastrophic
outcomes would, and should, dislodge any interpretive method or
decision-making protocol.
The low ceiling on this justification for originalism is nevertheless
visible. It cannot move attention from the basal policy questions, nor
does it create leverage on the straightforward moral issues for which
people already possess analytical tools. However essential or timeless,
the results question is likely to be more divisive and distracting than
encouraging for originalism. It is a component in the analysis rather
than a solution to it.
If the counter-impulse is to lurch away from results, consider the
argument that originalism is conceptually equal to interpretation. The
assertion is that interpretation simply is the search for a text's original
public meaning. Insofar as a decision-maker is engaged in some other
effort, she is not interpreting the document. 183 Time is plainly irrelevant
182 See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 225 (1960)
(estimating that the Court had "seldom strayed very far from the mainstreams of American life");
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
338 (1991) ("U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform.");
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (finding that Court policy ultimately converges with the positions
of national governing coalitions).
183 See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes... and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1823-24
(1997) (seeking to segregate the concept of interpretation from the practice of adjudication);
Solum, supra note 117, at 3-6 (portraying original semantic meaning as a factual matter, while
recognizing that such facts do not themselves justify abiding by that meaning).
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to this assertion but the stumbling blocks are equally apparent.
As a normative matter, the conceptual assertion is unresponsive. If
the assertion is meant as a definition for interpretation, then it seems
descriptive rather than normative. If the assertion is meant as a superior
understanding of what interpretation entails, it is unclear what test is
being suggested for superiority. Suppose someone asserts that we
should reserve the word "interpretation," not for original public
meaning, but for the recovery of authorial intent 184 or for the various
sources and methods on which judges and lawyers typically rely when
they claim to be interpreting a legal text.185 What good test is there for
judging these competing conceptions? Convention is inadequate. Not
only does that standard move us back toward description, common use
does not restrict "interpretation" to originalism.
A different argument is that the written Constitution is a law, and
that judges have a set interpretive practice for law that should apply
equally well to this document. 86 However convincing on its own
terms, this is not an argument from conceptual necessity. It is a claim
about the desirability of following "law" as defined in that particular
way rather than another. And if the argument proceeds to the assertion
that "law" simply is what originalism yields, then we are back where we
began: working with definitions without clearly entering the normative
debate. An originalism proponent who points to conceptual truth must
have something else in mind-merely clarifying terms as a matter of
throat-clearing, or stepping toward analogical reasoning across legal
texts that will operate on substantive principles not yet articulated, or
perhaps deploying a rhetorical strategy for capturing the term
"interpretation" or "law." Otherwise the topic of justification is left
unaddressed.
D.

Innovative Justifications
1.

Ex ante Incentives

There is another time-insensitive justification for strong
originalism in constitutional decision-making that might be more
promising. It concerns incentives for political action, and it returns to
184 See, e.g., Fish, supra note 114, at 1112, 1114; Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels,
Intention, Identity, and the Constitution: A Response to David Hoy, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS:
HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 187, 193-97 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992).

185 Cf DWORKIN, supra note 128, at 65-68 (integrating the "best" justifications for a practice
into the concept of interpretation); Kent Greenawalt, supra note 114, at 268, 268-70 (including
text, original meaning, underlying rationale or basic values, application to particular cases, and
stare decisis).
186 Cf BARNETT, supra note 117, at 100-07 (analogizing contracts).
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the dynamics of supreme-law generation discussed in Part 1.187 The
claim would be that respecting the text gives value to a venerable type
of political mobilization and, to couple this goal with originalism, that
original public meaning best approximates the political victories
achieved through Article V or VII.188
This justification is aggressively forward-looking.
Today's
decision to respect old Article V successes would be defended as an
instrument for inciting political mobilization in the future. It does not
require a special affinity for the founders, or a quirky preference for
delegating policy to the dead hand of the past, nor a positive evaluation
of originalism's results in any particular case. Instead the argument
means to be process focused and ex ante situated. Victory in the Article
V arena would be rewarded with a degree of insulation. Rolling back
those victories would essentially require yet another successful attempt
to overcome the hurdles of formal amendment. And the threat of
"change" through litigation might be reduced with a strong commitment
to originalism in judicial decision-making. We should be clear that this
move is not quite right for encouraging ordinary politics in the present;
sometimes those outcomes will be sacrificed to drive home the message
of Article V's value. The issue is whether this technique for rewarding
formal amendment would be and ought to be effective.
The logic should be familiar.1 89 Essentially the same arguments
have been made in law and economics when the question is why
testamentary instruments are respected in court. 90
It remains
uncomfortable for modem lawyers to suppose that the dead themselves
possess legal rights or entitlements. But the living may receive comfort
from signs that the terms of a valid will are generally followed if
intelligible, and their property might have greater value because of it.
They might acquire more or waste less of it. Perhaps the same rationale
works for Article V lawmaking.
Translating incentive arguments into justifications for originalism
has attractive features, but also complications. Difficult normative and
empirical questions must be answered before the incentives justification
becomes persuasive. Neither uncertainty nor indifference is enough.
To incline toward strong judicial originalism on this justification, one

187 The analysis below expands on Samaha, supra note 9, at 660-61.
188 Going forward, committing to enforcing original public meaning effectively defines Article
V victories as such. So the choice of interpretive method can be a transitional question, rather
than an entailment of the decision to encourage Article V lawmaking.
189 It does not seem prominent in the originalism literature. Cf WHITTINGTON, supra note
117, at 111-13 (viewing originalism as potentially pro-democracy); id. at 207 (suggesting,
without empirical evidence, that judicial updating can make "[t]he asserted impossibility of
constitutional amendment... a self-fulfilling prophecy").
190 See RICHARD

POSNER,

ECONOMIC

ANALYSIS

OF

LAW

518-20

(recommending efficiency constraints on testator preferences, however).
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should be satisfied that the Article V process is good enough to promote
in light of feasible alternatives and that a judicial commitment to
originalism is the effective and appropriate method of encouragement.
Given the present state of knowledge on Article V dynamics and the
likelihood of normative disagreement, there is reason for caution and
reflection.
To frame the analysis, assume that a category of sticky supreme
law is desirable but that the content of this category should be revised
episodically. Revisions might come in several forms: adding supreme
law or deleting some of it, entrenching ordinary political victories or
opening the way for them. The optimal method, or combination of
methods, for these revisions turns on the desired rate of revision and the
character of revisions expected from each of the possible processes.
This means that the dynamics of Article V lawmaking must be
understood given various conditions, and then compared to alternative
dynamics that are equally well-understood.
Putting it roughly, our current system of supreme law comprises
some number of Article V attempts and few successes, along with some
degree of judicial intervention that is itself revisable through additional
litigation or Article V. Other sources might function as a supreme law,
but accepting them as such would be controversial and complicate the
analysis. As for the judicial contribution to supreme law, it can run on
arguments similar in substance to those made during an Article V effort.
There is likely to be overlap between, for example, arguments in
support of sex equality through formal amendment and through judicial
renderings of the Equal Protection Clause. Still, the arguments are
subject to different forces in different lawmaking institutions, and they
will take different forms in court, which might influence outcomes. We
know that judges publicly deploy a range of analytic approaches in
constitutional cases-sometimes working with precedent and
92
principle, 19' sometimes combining originalism with other resources,
93
occasionally presenting extensive originalist histories.
How would supreme lawmaking change if the judiciary shifted to a
strong form of originalism? As indicated in Part II.B, it appears that no
191 See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Elec. Comm'n, 554 U.S

-,...

128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770-74 (2008)

(invalidating a rollback of campaign contribution limits for opponents of certain self-financing
candidates); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665-70 (2004) (affirming a preliminary injunction
against the Child Online Protection Act).
192 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-40 (2001) (objecting to home thermal
imaging on grounds including precedent, workable doctrine and originalist principle).
193 See, e.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. - ...
128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788-2812,

2816-18, 2821-22 (2008) (invalidating the District's ban on handgun possession in the home by
certain law-abiding citizens for the purpose of self defense, although listing presumptively valid
regulation without similar historical research); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-43
(2004) (revising Confrontation Clause doctrine on originalist arguments, although relying on

precedent to note that the Clause is applicable via the Fourteenth Amendment to a state trial).
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solid empirical study exists on the relationship between judicial
methods of interpretation and formal amendment rates. An acceptable
coding scheme for opinions needs to be worked out and other variables
must be adequately controlled. Until the work is done and vetted,
theory and speculation are the best available resources.
One possibility is that a shift to strong originalism would not have
much effect on Article V effort, let alone success rates. Remember that
the practical choice is not between strong originalism and no
originalism, but between strong originalism and today's weak or
episodic originalism. The smaller the magnitude of interpretive change,
the less significant any incentive is likely to be. Nor is the proposal to
subsidize Article V lawmaking. That process is going to be very
difficult to complete on most occasions regardless of interpretive
practices in the courts. Restricting the judicial role in supreme
lawmaking affects relative rather than absolute costs.
Of course, we might not expect any Article V effort if the judiciary
predictably intervenes early and with total disregard for the public
meaning of what had been accomplished. If adjudication lags are brief
and court judgments are always respected, and if courts then ignore
Article V text and the general social meaning of the text, those seeking
change in supreme law might as well begin with the courts. This
picture of judicial behavior is, however, incomplete. Adjudication lags
are sometimes long, and the Supreme Court often uses originalist tools
when the lag is brief. To the extent the Court dispenses with originalist
argument, it might be on issues where those arguments are unhelpful or
194
on issues where Amendment proponents are relatively indifferent.
There is also the issue of the time horizon of supreme law
reformers. Recall the compromise trajectory for originalism, under
which the method strongly influences decision-making close to
ratification and then flags over time. Whether or not this has been the
pattern in Court cases, it is an alternative to loyal originalism, and it
might provide equally powerful incentives for Article V effort. Much
depends on the discount rate of potential law reformers. If their
timeframe of concern is shorter than a century, for instance, then strong
originalism at t100 might be irrelevant. This is true even on the friendly
assumptions that strong originalism otherwise makes Article V victories
more attractive and that it provides determinate answers on textual
meaning. The issue of how courts should behave in a post-originalist
period remains unresolved on this analysis but, on the assumptions we
have made, the resolution of that question would not influence Article V
incentives.
The foregoing is built on educated guesses. Others might have

194 See supra text accompanying notes 146 & 151 (discussing Osborn).
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different intuitions. And the issue is importantly comparative: Given a

static judicial system that is sufficiently awful, and alternative
lawmaking processes that are sufficiently good, it would make sense to
experiment with even long-shot strategies to minimize judicial
influence. Extensive debate about the quality of judicial decisionmaking is ongoing, and there have been serious attempts to compare the

virtues and vices of different methods for supreme lawmaking.

95

this space, only brief observations are necessary.
The normative questions are unavoidable and controversial.

In
In

comparing Article V, judicial adjudication, and any other process for
supreme lawmaking, one should have at least a general sense of what

counts as good or bad supreme law. This sense is hardly uniform. For
example, it might be that the Supreme Court exercises its influence only
on the margins of public policy, 196 but that on those margins it tends to
favor elite values or countercyclical political ideologies. In contrast, it

might be that the institutions involved in Article V lawmaking slant
toward the interests of states as states and congressional power centers.

The content of supreme law generated by these options will differ, and
the processes are likely to reward different skills and behavior.
Evaluating those consequences depends on a theory of value.

Without making any clear mistakes in logical reasoning, an observer
might check his value set and conclude that it would be best if the Court
fully inherited the business of supreme lawmaking as a counterweight to

other forces in society; or instead Article V lawmaking dominated Court
influence in light of the sustained political organizing ordinarily
involved; or instead some other form of higher lawmaking became
exclusive, such as a popular vote instigated by national petition drives;
or instead the above processes were combined in some way, perhaps
195 See JOHN R. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 6 (1994); Adrian
Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law, in THE LEAST
EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 229, 259-71

(Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (comparing common-law constitutionalism with
formal amendment as a matter of theory on several dimensions of performance). For a brief recap
of potential dangers in Article V, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, What's Wrong with Constitutional
Amendments?, in "GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS": DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 39, 39-42 (Louis M. Seldman & Virginia E. Sloan eds., 1999). On
the threat to judicial power, see John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and
Constitutionalism,81 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1958-60, 1968 (2003); Henry Paul Monaghan, We the
People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121,
144, 174-76 (1996) (worrying about majoritarian forces). Other insight is provided by Donald J.
Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the
Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 116 (1993) (worrying about

efficient policy outcomes in light of Congress's ability to bottleneck Article V change); William
E. Forbath, The Politics of ConstitutionalDesign: Obduracy and Amendability-A Comment on
Ferejohn and Sager, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1965, 1965-71 (2003) (questioning whether constitutional
obduracy via Article V is net beneficial).
196 See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 251.
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just as they are now; or instead the project of categorically supreme law
were abandoned. These evaluations are not irrational, depending on the
operative normative framework.
Adding issues regarding the appropriate rate of revision for
supreme law, and the appropriate degree of incentive for the preferred
lawmaking process, further illustrates the complexity of the judgments
involved. If strong originalism is effective at channeling law reform
efforts toward Article V, there is the question of how strong the
incentive ought to be. In the extreme case, Article V would be the sole
process for higher lawmaking to the exclusion of (relatively) more case
specific adjudication, and formal amendments would arrive regularly.
Some might consider this outcome too destabilizing, or ultimately
demeaning to the value of the document as a national icon, or too
sanguine about entrenching value choices in text protected by Article V
even with a higher amendment rate. Others will be excited at the
prospect of supreme law migrating to supermajorities in Congress and
the states. Either way, one must have a sense of the proper level of
incentives. This is no easier than choosing the right length for a patent
term. 197
Last, there is the related issue of implementation. A cost-effective
strategy would be needed for enlisting and retaining strong originalist
judges of the right kind. We began the analysis by bracketing questions
of coordination within the judiciary by considering the options for a
single hypothetical judge. But at some point, an incentives-based
argument will want to check the achievable level of firm judicial
originalism against the desired strength of the incentive.
This effort to proliferate issues is not meant to be discouraging.
Choices must be made regardless of how complex the situation, and
incentives arguments have potential for some observers. With certain
empirical assumptions and normative commitments, an incentive-based
justification for originalism might be attractive. And this justification
would minimize if not defeat time-oriented objections. The strong
cautionary note, however, is that current knowledge makes the
necessary assumptions speculative and the commitment to Article V
debatable.
2.

The Randomization Analogy

Finally, there is a randomization analogy that might counsel
originalism in some form-or at least reconcile us to originalism's
197 See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-AntitrustIntersection: A Reappraisal,97 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1823-29 (1984) (identifying variables).
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persistence. It is only an analogy. Originalism, in current practice and
according to its proponents, is hardly the equivalent of law by lottery.
Nor would anyone endorse randomization for all questions raised by our
constitutional text. Offering an equal probability of victory to all
comers would reward and attract arguments without quality control.
Yet, in hard cases, randomization has virtues that originalism often aims
to capture, while originalism might be reworked to more closely
approximate random selection. This refashioned originalism will not
expire with time, at least not according to its internal logic. It could
even gain strength with age.
The suggested relationship might sound unfriendly. If there is any
current association between originalism and randomization, it is for
purposes of criticism. A skeptic might assert that any alleged public
agreement about a word's meaning is haphazardly determined by a
multiplicity of forces and the observer's selective reaction. 198 More
generally, randomization has a poor reputation in law. Deliberately
randomizing decisions on the merits has been a basis for censuring
judges, 199 and it has a look of arbitrariness which might contradict
intuitions about rational decision-making. 200
At least in theory, however, deliberate randomization could play a
positive role in adjudication. It has been fruitfully used in other
decision situations, after all. Law itself occasionally incorporates a
random element, sometimes to resolve high-stakes questions. Examples
include military drafts, immigration visa allocation, judicial case
assignments, jury selection, land partition, and testing for the use or
efficacy of drugs. 201 These applications suggest the advantages of
harnessing chance in a subset of decision situations. Putting aside the
possibility of divination, modern theory indicates entirely rational
arguments for randomization. 202
198 See Louis E. Wolcher, A Philosophical Investigation into Methods of Constitutional
Interpretationin the United States and the United Kingdom, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 239, 266
(2006) (noting a critique of originalism along these lines).
199 See In re Brown, 662 N.w.2d 733, 740-43 (Mich. 2003) (censuring a judge for publicly
flipping a coin to resolve a short-term child custody issue).
200 See NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE: ON LOTTERIES AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING

87-88 & n.6 (1999).
201 See id. at 43-45 (collecting examples of social decision by lot); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)
(2006) (regarding excess visas); Robertson v. Robertson, 484 S.E.2d 831, 835 (N.C. App. 1997)
(regarding partition assignments); HARRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE
AND THERAPEUTIC REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-1990, at 132-63 (1997) (regarding
randomized clinical trials).
202 See DUXBURY, supra note 200, at 43-84 (collecting instances of and arguments for
randomized social decisions); Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication (2008)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author); see also Edna Ullmann-Margalit & Sidney
Morgenbesser, Picking and Choosing, 44 SOC. RES. 757, 758-65, 769-70, 773-74 (1977)
(describing "picking" as opposed to "choosing" based on preferences and reasons). The idea of
"picking" interpretive rules is helpfully raised in VERMEULE, supra note 126, at 168-69, 179-80
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In its unweighted and statistical form, randomization offers equal
opportunity to receive a benefit or burden within a predetermined pool
of recipients. True, people often support allocation by merit, market,
need, effort, or equal shares by partition or time before turning to the
blindness of an unweighted lottery. 20 3 But the combination of equal
chances and a hard-line rule can be attractive, at least as a last resort
when reason cannot identify one outcome superior to all others.
Thus rational choice theorists are open to randomization for
resolving
persistent
uncertainty,
incommensurability,
or
204
indeterminacy.
When the correct norm is unclear or additional
relevant information is too costly to obtain, and when a decision
nonetheless ought to be made, a lottery can be the answer. Egalitarian
sentiment supplements the argument with a background commitment to
treating people equally. 20 5 Randomization is one way to do that.
Consider the allocation of a scarce and indivisible benefit, such as space
on an overcrowded lifeboat. Here equal shares are unworkable, while
equal chances are possible and perhaps most acceptable to the
passengers. Moreover, pragmatists can find admirable features in
randomization. The rule-like character of a lottery may be comforting.
A guarantee of equal probabilities aims to tie the hands of decisionmakers who might be distrusted, cuts incentives to curry favor with
them, and is cheap to execute once the rule is in place. 20 6 Of course
randomizing requires anterior decisions, such as what to randomize and
who to include in the pool. But aiming for equal chances may be best
when other options run out. Finally, randomization is a foundation for
experimentation. In fact, today's best empirical studies on causation
20 7
often rely on random assignment to treatment and control groups.
Enough uncertainty
surrounds constitutional design and
adjudication such that the theoretically optimal number of occasions for
randomization must be greater than zero. Despite our experience and
knowledge, we cannot with confidence conclude that bicameralism is
superior to unicameralism, or that presidential systems outperform
parliamentary systems, or perhaps even that democracies yield faster
(discussing interpretive canons and precedent).
203 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITr, TRAGIC CHOICES 41-44 (1978)

(critiquing lotteries and comparing them to other allocation rules). A weighted or stratified
lottery is a possible compromise between rewarding nothing and ranking everyone. See JON
ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 113-14

(1989).
204 See ELSTER, supra note 204, at 38, 107-09 (noting that the decision costs of "fine-tuned
screening" might be too expensive, leaving a residuum of uncertainty).
205 See BARBARA GOODWIN, JUSTICE BY LOTTERY 102-03 (1992) (exploring social lotteries
as devices to afford equal respect in situations of scarcity and structured inequality).
206 See DUXBURY, supra note 200, at 51-56.
207 See, e.g., Gary Burtless, The Case for Randomized Field Trials in Economic and Policy
Research, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 63, 66-67 (1995) (explaining the advantages).
HeinOnline -- 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1356 2008-2009

2008]

ORIGINALISM'S EXPIRA TION DA TE

1357

economic growth than dictatorships. 20 8 Even if everyone agreed on the
values to be maximized, many choices about the character of
government would have little or no impact beyond short-term
distributions, so far as we can tell, and we might have difficulty
ascertaining both the sign and magnitude of any impact. Some of these
choices will be posed in litigation. Granted, no one thinks that all paths
are equal in constitutional law. But no one can realistically believe that
all outcomes are meaningfully different, and there is more than one way
to select a stable solution after the clearly inferior outcomes are weeded
out.

Indeed, lot-drawing is part of U.S. constitutional history. Article I,
Section 3 of the Constitution announced that "immediately after [the
senators] shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they
shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes" with initial
terms of three different lengths. When the Senate first organized in
1789, its members sought to follow this directive but the text seems
unclear about how the three classes should be composed. The senators
began working the problem with deliberation. They submitted the issue
to a committee, which suggested an initial principle: sorting the senators
into three geographically diverse groups with no two senators from the
same state in the same group. 20 9 But this left the decision of which
group of senators to assign to each class. The senators could have
deliberated and negotiated on this issue as well. Instead the committee
offered another solution: randomization. One senator from each group
would draw a lot from a box and the fate of each group would be
determined accordingly. The initial allocation was performed in this
manner, and a modified version of the lottery has been used upon the
admission of new states into the union. 210 Surviving records may not
explain why the first Senate chose randomization. But we can defend
the lottery as assuring equal chances when norms beyond geographic
mixing were unclear, sharing was not permitted, pool members enjoyed
208 See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF

THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 151 (2004) (arguing that constitutionalization of rights in four
studied countries "has achieved little or no real change in arenas such as wealth redistribution,
minority political representation, and the equalization of life conditions"); JAN-ERIK LANE,
CONSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 208-10 (1996) (finding little connection between
economic outcomes and institutional design in OECD countries); ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL.,
DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD,

1950-1990, at 142, 166-67, 178-79 (2000) (finding that economic development is generally not
significantly influenced by the division between democratic and dictatorial rule); Adam M.
Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 624-29 (2006) (collecting studies).
209 See generally DANIEL WIRLS & STEPHEN WiRLS, THE INVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES

SENATE 163-64, 171 (2004).
210 See Floyd M. Riddick, The Classification of United States Senators, Sen. Doc.
No. 103, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1-5 (1966). Some originalists might see the Senate's decision
as an example of constitutional construction outside the courts, not interpretation. To reiterate,
my interest is in sound decision-making, not interpretation standing alone.
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presumptively equal status, and the discretion of fellow politicians
1
might be distrusted. 21
Is it too much to expect the judiciary to act like the first Senate,
and on occasion combine deliberation with overt randomization?
Probably. Judges have self-regulated against flipping coins on merits
decisions, constitutional or not. One might think this position socially
suboptimal. 212 But courts face a public relations problem with
deliberately randomizing any judgments, and one might worry that there
is no easily articulated test for randomization's proper domain. In any
event, we can assume that literal randomization in the courts is
foreclosed. The question is whether originalist inquiry is ever a
substitute for randomization-a substitute that runs on similar
arguments to meet similar goals.
To be sure, originalism as currently practiced is far from
randomization. Historical investigation requires human judgment and it
can be guided by its users to reach outcomes preferred on other
grounds. 213 It was not shocking that two coalitions of justices in 2008
described two incompatible lessons from history surrounding the
Second Amendment. 214 In addition, for at least some time periods, the
historical sources will not offer equal probabilities for plausible
outcomes. The history may skew toward one of today's ideological
camps, and thus choosing originalism may look like choosing the
outcome. This is perhaps less likely for certain structural issues, but a
tilt might be supposed for issues including firearms, religion, sex
equality, and property rights. Seeking answers from history is also
controversial, if not self-destructive, in that it would systematically
privilege ancient judgments. Moreover, originalism can be costly when
performed conscientiously, 215 and those resources tend not to foster
experiments. Originalism in a strong form joined with stare decisis
would inhibit further innovation. Nor can originalism guarantee
determinate answers to specific questions. Literal randomization can.
Nevertheless, some version of originalism may share strengths
211 Cf DUXBURY, supra note 200, at 26-32 (presenting a short history of election by lot).
212 See Samaha, supra note 202 (exploring a restricted domain of merits randomization in
adjudication, and the influence of random case assignment on outcomes); cf ELSTER, supra note
203, at 37, 116-17, 121 (suggesting that people tend to cling to "the rituals of reason" even when
randomization is a suitable decision rule).
213 See, e.g., Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An OriginalLook at Originalism,36 LAW
& Soc'y REv. 113, 130-32 (2002) (finding that text- or intent-based arguments in party briefs
generally do not predict justices' voting behavior as well as proxies for judicial ideology). It is
not clear that any interpretive method ties the hands of its users very firmly.
214 Compare Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
, _.
128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008)
(indicating "no doubt" that the Second Amendment confers a limited individual right
unconnected with militia service), with id. at 2826 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the
Framers' single-minded focus.., was on military uses of firearms").
215 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 117, at 851-52, 856-57 (recommending originalism but
acknowledging the decision costs of high-quality historical investigation).
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with the rational use of randomization in hard cases. Both can aspire to
a kind of neutrality in decision-making. 21 6
Suppose that our
hypothetical judge is committed to abiding by the Constitution, but its
text is unclear with respect to the contemporary issue she faces, and she
screens out understandings plainly intolerable for us. People will
disagree about how any screening should be done, but grant the wisdom
of critics and accept that non-originalist considerations have been and
should be used to reduce social costs. Still the judge remains uncertain.
We might be pleased if she then consults historical sources linked to the
text, even if we have no confidence that originalist sources will suggest
the all-told best outcome on this issue and even if we are not convinced
that conceptual necessity, precommitment, or incentive effects justify
history's authority. Without any greater faith in originalism, it can be a
convenient and culturally acceptable tool for dispute resolution when
other options fail. If so, time lags might be unimportant. History would
serve as a tiebreaker regardless. Long lags might even assist decisionmakers in achieving "arbitrary" results neutralized from presentmoment ideology. Time has a way of placing nonhistorians behind a
veil of ignorance regarding the past's meaning, and of disconnecting
2 17
current ideological cleavages from older orders.
The argument here is not terribly different from a rationale for
paying attention to the written Constitution itself: the focal point theory
of authority.2 1 8 For many disputes, settling them decisively is more
important than expending resources in a possibly futile attempt to
optimize the outcome. Referring to the document can accomplish this.
Every reader agrees that the document calls for bicameralism, people
tend to refer to the document to answer such questions, they are already
coordinated on bicameralism, and that is good enough. Neither the
focal point theory nor the randomization account of historical argument
is bothered by arbitrariness in resolving a class of constitutional
questions. Both gravitate toward salient solutions instead of answers
216 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 116, at 17-18, 37-41 (supporting original public meaning
textualism with democratic and rule-of-law values against the creation of new law by judicial
preferences); Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 283, 284-88 (1996) (similar).
217 One might wonder whether relying on a roughly fixed set of historical sources can qualify,
conceptually, as randomization or anything like it. But if we agree to draw from an urn of blue
and red balls to resolve a dispute, the process could still be considered randomization if the balls
were placed there 200 years ago. The same holds even if we discover after the draw that 99% of
the balls were in fact red. Accord ELSTER, supra note 204, at 43-46 (discussing a die loaded in
an unknown fashion and distinguishing such epistemic randomness from objective
equiprobability); Lewis A. Komhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Just Lotteries, 27 SOc. SCI. INFO.
483, 487-88 (1988) (arguing that the equiprobability event need not come after the decisionmaker chooses a lottery as the basis for allocation).
218 See Strauss, supra note 10, at 1732; id. at 1737 (adding that "[p]recedents can be focal;
original understandings can be focal"); see also Samaha, supra note 208, at 623-29 (stressing
uncertainty as a motivator for using focal points).
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that are morally justifiable in another way.
There is a potential difference, however. The basic elements of the
focal point idea are that the document is already a salient resource for
limiting disagreement, that people are willing to accept answers
indicated by a "straightforward" reading of the text even if they do not
believe those answers are optimal, and that courts should try to avoid
disrupting this coordinating function of the document. 219 However, the
theory indicates that the document should become less important when
the stakes are high and disagreement is intense. 220 The randomization
model for originalism need not conform to these boundaries. While
cultural support for historical references helps the technique get off the
ground, the importance, stakes, or disagreement surrounding an issue
does not rule out judicial use of history to settle disputes. Its propriety
begins with serious uncertainty rather than relative unimportance. I
would not want to decouple the randomization analogy from the focal
point model; indeed people who prioritize agreement may randomize
for the purpose of coordinating, akin to what the first Senate did. But
the two accounts do seem distinct.
Stripping history of greater pretensions, however, does indicate
that originalism should be kept simple. Professional excellence is
unnecessary if the goal is convenient and detached dispute resolution in
close cases, and originalism better tracks the virtues of randomization if
it is economical and unsophisticated. Here there is no premium for
objective historical truth or the complete intellectual map of
constitutional thought. To minimize decision costs, it seems best for
judges to rely on a relatively quick first take on salient ratification era
sources, followed by modest additional research to confirm that their
first impression is plausible. This is not so far from the originalism
sometimes practiced in court. Contrast professional histories such as
Jack Rakove's iconic Original Meanings, Eric Foner's masterful
Reconstruction, and Gordon Wood's triumph, The Creation of the

American Republic. These would not be the models; in fact, judges
might have to avoid reading them. Legal history that is "sloppy,
superficial, and sometimes inaccurate" 221 would not be a major concern,
while the historian's understandable "fondness for nuance,
understatement, texture, and even irony" 222 would be a vice.
219 See Strauss, supra note 10, at 1731-38, 1744 (explaining the idea and criticizing
originalism insofar as it prevents common-law development of open-ended provisions with
specific historical judgments).
220 See id. at 1743.
221 DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA

SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE

MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 17 (2002) (criticizing Robert Bork);

see also Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM.
L. REv. 523, 524-30 (1995) (criticizing many originalists for unprofessional histories).
222 Jack N. Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of History, 11 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 191, 195
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Furthermore, original public meaning need not be the exclusive form of
inquiry. Occasionally that question will be too abstract for concrete
decisions while drafting history, even if unreliable for judging collective
223
intentions or meaning, will do the trick.
Consider one possible application of this version of originalism.
Part of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment describes a dispute resolution
mechanism for use when the President is allegedly "unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office" and an Acting President attempts to
assume power. 224 The process involves the Vice President's judgment
plus majority votes of the principal officers of executive departments
"or of such other body as Congress may by law provide. '225 If there
were a power struggle under these provisions, and if the courts were
called on to say what counts as "unable" or "other body"-suppose that
the President was kidnapped instead of mentally incapacitated, or that
by statute Congress had selected itself as the other body-few would be
shocked if originalist arguments were deployed. They might be rightly
outcome-determinative.
But this is not to concede that the
Amendment's drafters or ratifiers had special insight in 1967 into the
finest dispute resolution mechanism for this occasion. Instead, scraps of
ratification history could point toward a defensible solution that stops
short of extensive judicial design choices or a flat assessment of who
among the contenders might make the better president. 226 The
alternatives could be worse. It is difficult to imagine a shared
presidency or an auction for the office. In tight spots, judges sometimes
defer to another institution's judgment, but here there is no apparent
location on which to unload the question without making serious
normative judgments first.
If the randomization analogy is too weak to endorse, it still might
help outsiders accept certain debatable Supreme Court decisions. One
(1999) (book review).
223 When presenting originalist argument, judges have not restricted themselves to an
especially narrow set of sources anyway. See, e.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. _,
__, 128 S.Ct.2783, 2810-12 (2008) (relying on late nineteenth-century sources to help interpret
a 1791 text); Boumediene v. Bush, 554 U.S -,... 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2245-51 (2008) (relying
on drafting history at the Philadelphia Convention and other sources to ascertain the significance
of habeas corpus at the founding); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-50 (2004)
(examining English, colonial, and state practice in an Eighth Amendment case); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729-30 (1986) (relying on drafting history of the impeachment provisions);
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787-92 (1983) (relying on practice from the First Congress
onward).

224 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
225 Id.

226 For one view of the congressional debate regarding other bodies, see JOHN D. FEERICK,
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS 206 (1992)

(indicating that Congress may attempt to select itself). On the concept of inability, see id. at 20002 (indicating that kidnapping is included). I do not assert that Feerick's findings match a casual
reading of the relevant history. That might be taken to impugn his work.
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might recharacterize several opinions as roughly tolerable coin flips,
regardless of how the justices experienced them. For example, Court
majorities might have failed to produce professional history in
recognizing state sovereign immunity in the absence of consent to
suit. 227 But the outcome was consistent with one interpretation of a
digression in The Federalist,22 8 and the possibility of state consent and
its federal encouragement will limit the doctrine's impact. Or consider
the Court's decision to declare invalid the legislative veto, forms of
which had been inserted into countless statutes. 229 To some this is a
blockbuster decision. It must be difficult for an empiricist to agree.
The case seems to have had no provable lasting impact on policy or
power. 230
Empirical studies may explain cause and effect in
constitutional design, yet they also reveal critical areas of uncertainty.
Add the presence of reasonable normative disagreement plus the
cultural support for arguments from the nation's past, and the case for
23 1
originalist randomization improves.
As with literal randomization, however, the directions suggested
by history might be overwhelmed by other considerations. Careful
readers of The Federalist, for instance, are bound to be startled on
occasion. Today we ignore the idea that cabinet secretaries should be
able to keep their jobs after a new President is inaugurated unless the
Senate consents to their removal. 232 That arrangement is no longer
viable even if Hamilton interpreted the text correctly.
In any event, an economical originalism must be compared against
alternative decision rules 233-everything
from judicial discretion, to
common-law reasoning, to normatively driven presumptions, to judicial
abstinence. Judges should be fairly certain that uncertainty surrounds
the issue, not just their own ignorance. Often judges have good reason
to be unsure about the normatively correct outcome, but other officials
will be far better prepared to answer. These are not promising cases for
using history as a tiebreaker, except perhaps in situations of
extrajudicial stalemate.
227 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1996).
228 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
229 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59 (1983).
230 See LOUIS FISHER,

CONSTITUTIONAL

DIALOGUES:

INTERPRETATION

AS

POLITICAL

PROCESS 225 (1988); Samaha, supra note 208, at 638; cf Jessica Kom, Improving the
Policymaking Process by Protectingthe Separation of Powers: Chadha & the Legislative Vetoes
in Education Statutes, 26 POLITY 677, 677-80, 687-96 (1994) (claiming, however, that Congress
stabilized certain funding decisions, took responsibility for them, and initiated negotiated

rulemaking).
231 Support for historical references in the general public can be in tension with the
randomization analogy, however. Judges who use history as nothing more than a convenient
tiebreaker are not obviously matching the culture's hopes or expectations for that information.
232 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
233 See Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-OrderDecisions, 110 ETHICS 5,
14 (1999) (comparing costs of various decision strategies at different stages).
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Further, an economical originalism might be too unpredictable to
use very often. Literal randomization is even worse on this score, but
economical originalism might be less predictable than thorough
historical investigation or current judicial practice.234 Instability in
judicial decision-making might be of less concern; ordinary rules of res
judicata and stare decisis would prevent serial destabilization. Yet
judges would have to understand which decisions were products of
casual historicism to prevent them from having broader subsequent
impact.
Finally, ideological bias in history is still an issue. Perhaps its
likelihood is even greater for relatively superficial investigations when
particular litigants and immediate consequences are in plain view.
While such bias can be monitored by comparing actual outcomes to a
random distribution, effective monitoring does not guarantee its
elimination.
Even so, impressionistic history has its place. Constitutional
arguments can be close and threaten to be endless, tolerable results can
be difficult to rank, split-the-difference compromises might not be
available, the text's history might not match the litigants' ideological
cleavages, and a look at history is within judicial competence. It is
often consistent with public expectations. Economical originalism can
thus function like a random solution to a problem that the decisionmaker is willing to accept as difficult.
This brand of historicism is not defended with the morality of
precommitment, or the conceptual necessities of law, or the belief that
fidelity to ancient choices yields correct answers, or the hope that it will
incentivize healthy democratic organizing. For those who feel certain
about the appropriate content for supreme law, then, the approach will
not be attractive. Many lawyers and judges display this kind of
certitude; they are often trained to do so. But the reaction should be
different for those who become convinced that many constitutional
choices are difficult, that some consequences are hard to predict, and
that human beings tend to adapt around the decisions of courts
regardless. For them, the clipped use of history in adjudication will be,
on occasion, the mark of humility and impartiality rather than divination
or fatalism when the die is cast.

234 See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The
Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1150, 1152, 1163-79 (2004) (reporting
predictive accuracy of a statistical model and expert predictions for case outcomes).
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CONCLUSION

In its documentary form, our supreme law is aging. Even if it were
not, the judiciary would tend to arrive late in the process of
understanding it. These are facts of life in our constitutional system.
They should prompt the question whether the influence of originalism
on decision-making should vary with distance from ratification.
In response, I have presented a prima facie case for the degrading
influence of time on originalism's strength in judicial decision-making,
along with challenges to this compromise. In the wake of ratification,
originalism often will but should not always dictate outcomes in
constitutional adjudication. Like later periods, that will depend on its
determinacy, practical feasibility, destructive impact and the chosen role
for the judiciary. Long after ratification, originalism probably should
expire for many disputes. The passage of time makes a strong, broad,
and sophisticated originalism much less plausible.
However, the case for a fading originalism might be overcome
with one of two innovative arguments. A strong and lasting judicial
originalism might generate sufficiently beneficial ex ante incentives for
a particular type of political organizing, if one prefers that brand of
politics and if one is willing to make a set of empirical assumptions in
the face of uncertainty. Or instead the defense of enduring originalist
decision-making might begin with an admission that uncertainty will
persist, that history sometimes provides no better insight than
randomization, and that something like randomization can be a rational
response to hard cases. These justifications might be too weak or too
narrow to satisfy originalism's typical proponents. But they do begin to
confront powerful arguments that will otherwise set an expiration date
for originalism.
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APPENDIX
CASES USED TO CALCULATE CITATION AND ADJUDICATION LAGS

Amendment

Citation Lag

Interpretation Lag

1st (1791)

84 years-see next column

2nd (1791)

66 years-Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. 393, 417, 450 (1857)
(opinion of Taney, C.J.)

3rd (1791)

162 years-see next column

4th (1791)

64 years*-Murray v. Hoboken
Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272,
285-86 (1855) (holding the Fourth
Amendment's Warrant Clause
inapplicable to a creditors' civil
action)

84
years-United
States
v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875)
(holding
the
Petition
Clause
inapplicable to the states); see also
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145,
162 (1878) (upholding a
polygamy ban against a Free Exercise
Clause objection)
84
years-United
States
v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875)
(holding that Second Amendment
rights against Congress did not permit
the Enforcement Act of 1870 to be
used against citizens who lynched
other citizens); see also United States
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)
(interpreting the Second Amendment
to not cover sawed-off shotguns)
162 years-Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
644 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(raising the Third Amendment in a
discussion of the balance of authority
between the President and Congress);
see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (noting the Third
Amendment to help construct a
privacy principle)
42 years*-Livingston's Lessee v.
Moore, 32 U.S. 469, 478-79, 482,
539, 551-52 (1833) (holding several
Bill of Rights arguments inapplicable
to the states, but without citing the
Fourth Amendment)

5th (1791)

42 years*-Barron v. City of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51
(1833) (holding the Takings Clause
inapplicable to the states)

38 years*-Satterlee v. Matthewson,
27 U.S. 380, 406, 413-14 (1829)
(rejecting an attempt to build a vested
rights objection from multiple clauses,
citing the Fifth
but without
Amendment)

* The citation lag can be longer than the adjudication lag. Sometimes the Court resolves a
constitutional argument raised by a party without explicitly mentioning the Amendment in
question. However, this table relies on searches of text contained in the United States Reports.
Although the earlier volumes in this series describe attorney arguments, the series as a whole will
not identify every constitutional argument raised by a party and adjudicated by the Court.
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6th (1791)

62 years-see next column

62 years-United States v. Dawson,
56 U.S. 467, 487-88 (1853) (holding
that the Sixth Amendment's venue
provision did not apply to crimes
committed in "Indian country")

7th (1791)

17 years-see next column

17 years-United States
& Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4
452 (1808) (permitting
without jury
over
Amendment objection)

8th (1791)

42 years-Ex parte Watkins, 32
U.S. 568, 573-74 (1833) (denying
appellate jurisdiction to revise or
reverse a criminal sentence and
stating, in the alternative, that an
excessive fine under the Eighth
Amendment could not be shown on
the record)

75 years-Pervear v. Massachusetts,
72 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1866) (holding
the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to
the states and, in the alternative, that it
was not violated by imprisoning
defendant for selling liquor without a
license); see also Wilkerson v. Utah,
99
U.S.
130,
134-37
(1878)
(interpreting the Eighth Amendment as
no barrier to a judge ordering death by
public shooting for a first-degree
murder in Utah territory)

9th (1791)

145 years-see next column

145 years-Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 330-31,
338-40 (1936) (holding that the Ninth
Amendment did not withdraw power
from Congress to sell electricity from
a government dam)

10th (1791)

28 years-see next column

28 years-McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316, 406-07 (1819) (upholding
congressional authority to charter a
bank and contrasting the Tenth
Amendment with the Articles of
Confederation)

11 th (1798)**

0 years-see next column

0 years-Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (concluding
that the Eleventh Amendment applied
to pending cases)

12th (1804)

88 years-McPherson v. Blacker,
146 U.S. 1, 26 (1892)

148 years-Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S.
214, 224-25 & n.ll, 228-30 (1952)
(interpreting the Twelfth Amendment
as no barrier to party pledges in elector
primaries)

v. The Betsey
Cranch) 443,
a libel trial
a
Seventh

** The Eleventh Amendment was proclaimed ratified by the President in January 1798, see

JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 20 (1987), and Hollingsworth followed shortly thereafter. The time lags for
this Amendment could be increased by using 1795 as the ratification date, which is apparently
when a sufficient number of states had acted to meet the Article V requirements. See id.; see also
Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1921) (indicating the Court's belief that amendments'
status as law does not depend on a proclamation from the Secretary of State).
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13th (1865)

7 years-see next column

7 years-Osbom v. Nicholson, 80
U.S. 654, 662-63 (1872) (allowing
enforcement of a slave sale contract
that was formed before the Thirteenth
Amendment)

14th (1868)

1 year-Worthy v. Commissioners
76 U.S. 611, 613 (1869) (citing
Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment but dismissing for
want of a federal question
presented below)

5 years-Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. 36, 77-78 (1873) (interpreting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as no
barrier to a state-created monopoly);
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 13839 (1873) (interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment as no barrier to excluding
women from the bar)

15th (1870)

1 year-White v. Hart, 80 U.S.
646, 648 (1871) (quoting a federal
statute that cited the Fifteenth
Amendment)

2 years-Slaughter-House Cases 83
U.S. 36, 71-72 (1872) (using the
Fifteenth Amendment to help confine
the purpose of the Thirteenth)

16th (1913)

3 years-see next column

3 years-Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 240 U.S. 1, 10-21 (1916)
(upholding a federal income tax as
within the scope of congressional
authority
under
the
Sixteenth
Amendment)

17th (1913)

8 years-see next column

8 years-Newberry v. United States,
256 U.S. 232, 249-53 (1921) (denying
congressional power to regulate
campaign
financing
in
Senate
primaries)

18th (1919)

1 year-Duhne v. New Jersey, 251
U.S. 311, 313 (1920) (denying
original
jurisdiction
over
a
challenge
to
the Eighteenth
Amendment's
validity
under
Article V)

1 year-Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253
U.S. 350, 385-88 (1920) (stating
answers to questions about the scope
of the Eighteenth Amendment)

19th (1920)

2 years-Leser v. Garnett, 258
U.S. 130, 135-37 (1922) (denying
challenges to the Nineteenth
Amendment's
validity
under
Article V)

17 years-Breedlove v. Suttles, 302
U.S. 277, 283-84 (1937) (holding that
a state could encourage a white male
to pay a poll tax by refusing to allow
him to vote unless he paid, while at the
same time exempting women from the
tax altogether if they did not register to
vote)

20th (1933)

< still running >

< still running >

21st (1933)

1 year-see next column

1 year-United States v. Chambers,
291 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1934)
(interpreting
the
Twenty-First
Amendment to prohibit pending
National Prohibition Act prosecutions
from going forward)
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22nd (1951)

13 years-Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 370 (1964) (citing the
Twenty-Second Amendment in a
hypothetical)

22 years-Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
157-58 (1973) (using the TwentySecond Amendment as one basis for
excluding the unborn from the term
"person"
in
the
Fourteenth
Amendment)

23rd (1961)

3 years-Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 555 n.28 (1964) (citing
the Twenty-Third Amendment for
a trend)

<stillrunning>

24th (1964)

0 years-Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 555 n.28 (1964) (citing
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment for
a trend)

1 year-Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 529, 538-40, 544 (1965)
(holding that a state could not demand
that a voter in a federal election either
pay a poll tax or file a certificate of
residence)

25th (1967)

7 years-Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S.
709, 714 (1974)
(citing the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment for a
trend, although this reference is
probably an error in the Court's
opinion)

24 years-Freytag v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 88687 (1991) (using a Twenty-Fifth
Amendment legislative report as
instructive regarding the Opinions
Clause and therefore the Appointments
Clause)

26th (1971)

1 year-Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 197 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); see also Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 713 (1974)
(citing
the
Twenty-Sixth
Amendment in a discussion of
candidate filing fees)

8 years-United States v. Texas, 445
F. Supp. 1245, 1261-62 (D. Tex.
1978) (three-judge panel) (holding that
certain registration rules violated the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment rights of
college dorm residents), summarily
aff'd, Symm v. United States, 439 U.S,
1105 (1979)***

27th (1992)

< still running >

< still running >

Average:

35 years

42 years

Standard
Deviation:

44 years

47 years

** * This represents a summary affirmance that was identified based on a dissenting opinion.
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